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Advanced Course, Spring 1998
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THE SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LOYAL ORDERS' PA-
RADES IN NORTHERN IRELAND

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INTRODUCTION

Northern Ireland has for the last thirty years been one of Europe's most troubled spots, due to a violent political conflict. The last few years, however, have seen a peace process in Northern Ireland that has not only resulted in ceasefires from the major paramilitary groups, but also quite recently ended up in a historic agreement that could lead to a peaceful future.

However, the peace process has been in difficulty for three summers in a row because of disorders connected with the Loyal Orders' parades. All three summers, there have been riots with very serious consequences: people have been injured and killed, property has been destroyed, the polarization of the society has increased and the on-going peace process has suffered setbacks. In 1996, Northern Ireland was even brought to a standstill for four days due to riots caused by a banned march in Portadown, Co. Armagh.

Northern Ireland is a place where symbols play an important role, and it is quite clear that the parades are of symbolic value both to the marchers, i.e. the Loyal Orders, and their opponents, i.e. the nationalist residents who do not wish to see Loyal parades on their streets. The parades issue has become a microcosm of the larger conflict, and it has shown a terrifying potential of deepening the polarization of Northern Ireland.

It is clear that the parades issue has become one of the most important issues to solve if peace is to last in Northern Ireland. The people in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland will vote upon the peace agreement on May 22. Even if the agreement is endorsed in the referenda, the parades issue might wreck the hopes of a peaceful future if this summer will be like the three previous. It is very hard to see how peace will be reached if the people in Northern Ireland continues to spend every July in violent confrontations over parades.

The importance of the parades issue shows the value of studying it more closely, and especially to study the symbolism attached to it. Theories of political symbolism can help us to understand why the parades issue has become so hot during the peace process, how the different actors in the process have used it and how the controversies might be solved.

As Northern Ireland is such a highly symbolic place, terminology is part of politics and can be controversial. It is therefore important to be explicit in how the words are used in this paper, and the reader is advised to read the terminology in Appendix I. A reader not familiar with Irish politics should also look at Appendix II which provides a brief overview of the political parties, organizations etc in Northern Ireland.

PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The purpose of this study is to make an analysis of why the Loyal Orders' parades have become such a significant political symbol for both communities in Northern Ireland, and how this is connected with the peace process. The research questions are:

- ◆ Why did the parades issue become repoliticized in 1995?
- ◆ What do the marches symbolize for unionists and nationalists respectively, and what kind of social problems, political leaders and political enemies have they constructed from the parades spectacle?
- ◆ How do the British and Irish governments deal with the symbolism of the parades issue?
- ◆ Has the symbolism of the parades issue been used in the peace process?

METHOD

This study is a qualitative analysis of both primary and secondary material concerning Northern Ireland and the parades issue. The analysis also have comparative traits as the aim is to compare the different views on the parades issue among the two communities in Northern Ireland and the British and Irish governments. In many cases, material from organizations etc representing the two different communities has also been compared, as they sometimes present quite different versions of reality.

Some statistics have been used. The statistics showing the number of contentious marches comes from the RUC, the Northern Irish police force, and even though several actors in the parades spectacle accuse the RUC of bias, no objections to these statistics have been voiced. Statistics on the size of the two communities is taken from censuses, and some statistic studies made by scholars have also been used.

The theoretical framework is built on political symbolism, mainly the theories of Murray Edelman and his ideas of how political symbolism is used for the construction of political spectacles. The material used in this paper has been analyzed with these theories as a framework, and the focus has been to see how the different social problems, political leaders and political enemies constructed by the actors in question are related to the peace process, and what implications the parades issue has for this process.

LIMITATIONS

The time period for the analysis is the last three summers, i.e. the summer of 1995, 1996 and 1997. This period was chosen because it was the summer of 1995 that the parades issue became repoliticized, with the first standoff at Drumcree church in Portadown, Co. Armagh. The parades issue has since then continued to be hot, but it has a seasonal character. The so-called marching season lasts from Easter to September with the climax in mid-July to mid-August, apart from a few occasional marches. Therefore the summers are the most interesting periods to look at, and the summer of 1997 marks the end of the time period. However, during the writing of this paper, reality interfered and the peace process took a drastically new turn when a peace agreement was reached on Good Friday in 1998. As the parades issue is intertwined with the peace process it turned out to be just impossible to overlook the peace agreement and therefore the time period has been stretched a bit.

The analysis focuses on the Drumcree march in Portadown the Sunday before the Twelfth of July. It would not be possible in a study of this size to examine all contentious marches thoroughly. The reasons for choosing this march as the focus for the study are that this march made the parades issue really hot in 1995. It has since then been the march getting most attention and Drumcree has been the most serious flashpoint the last few years.

The analysis is also limited when it comes to material. The paper is written in Sweden and it has not been possible to conduct interviews with people involved, apart from some contacts via e-mail. However, I have spent a great deal of time in Ireland, and I spent the whole summer of 1997 there, mainly in the Republic of Ireland. I was then following Irish news very closely on the parades issue and the peace process, both newspapers, radio and TV. Just after the peace agreement was reached I spent two weeks in Ireland and thereby had the opportunity to follow the immediate aftermath of the agreement in a way that would not have been possible in Sweden.

I have been to Northern Ireland several times, the last time in April 1998 when I spent a weekend in Belfast and had a look at Lower Ormeau Road, one of the main flashpoints of the parades issue. I was also in the nationalist parts of West Belfast, a Sinn

Féin stronghold, and talked with some people about the peace agreement. In 1997, I saw a band parade in Kilkeel, Co. Down, one of the many parades that is not contentious. I also spent a day in Derry after that and talked to some people about the parades, especially about the Apprentice Boys Day parade that was due to happen a week later.

Another important limitation is that the media have been excluded as actors in the analysis. Murray Edelman considers the media to be among the actors constructing a spectacle, and it is obvious that the media have played a big part in the parades issue. Most likely, media attention has spurred both sides in their intransigence, and has made the parades spectacle more suitable to use as a symbol. However, to include the media as an actor would make the analysis grow too big, and possibly, it would end up more as a media analysis than anything else. Therefore, the media have been excluded from the actors, but this does not exclude an awareness of the media's importance.

Besides, I have already made a media study on the parades issue. For my B-level paper, I made a content analysis on the coverage in an Irish and a British quality paper, i.e. the Irish Times and the Independent, of the Drumcree crisis in 1996. This study only covered the six most important days of the crisis, but it nevertheless showed some significant differences in the reporting. To begin with, the Irish Times wrote very much more than the Independent about the event. The Irish Times' coverage was also more complex and multidimensional, whereas the Independent relied much more on a conflict frame. Whereas the Irish Times connected the crisis to the on-going peace process to a much greater extent, the Independent instead stressed the alienation of the Ulster Protestants, and how awkward they are in modern British society.

These differences in the reporting can be connected to different cultural contexts in the two countries. In Britain, opinion polls since the mid-70s have shown that most British would like to loose the ties with Northern Ireland, whereas Northern Ireland is of great concern to many of the people in the Republic of Ireland.

MATERIAL

For my theoretical framework, I have used writings on political symbolism. Also, to explain the concept of symbolism, some books that are dealing with language have been used. The analysis is based mainly on Murray Edelman's theories on political symbolism, but other scholars have been used as well. Many of those who write on political symbolism, e.g. Elder and Cobb, are very influenced by Edelman though.

It is always important to be aware of biased sources when doing research, and in the case of Northern Ireland it is even more important as few manage to write neutrally on the issue. The way you look on Northern Ireland often depends on whether you are starting from an Irish or a British perspective.

Irish and British newspapers treat Northern Ireland differently, as shown in the content analysis I made, which stresses the importance of looking at both Irish and British journalistic material. It is also likely that these differences are not only found in media reporting, but also between Irish and British commentators, political scientists etc. For this paper it has been an aim to find a balance between Irish and British sources, and it has not been completely successful. As I am spending a great deal of time in Ireland, it has been much easier to find Irish material. Irish newspapers also have better and more easily accessible websites, consisting of all the material from their printed editions, and with free archives. Another important point is also that British newspapers write very little on Northern Ireland, compared to Irish papers.

Of the Northern Irish papers, it is hard to find material from unionist papers as they do not really occur on the Internet. An exception to this is the Belfast Telegraph which is read by people from both sides. However, it would be more interesting to use views

from clearly nationalist and unionist paper, but only the nationalist papers seem to have invested in websites. Not to tip the balance in favour of the nationalist side even more, Northern Irish papers have been avoided completely.

It is easy to find Irish-related material on the Internet. Here, interest organizations, political parties, the NIO (the Northern Ireland Office) and the RUC (the Northern Irish police force) present themselves. Much material was found on the Derry-based human rights organization the Pat Finucane Centre's website (Pat Finucane was a lawyer assassinated by loyalist paramilitaries). The Pat Finucane Centre is clearly a nationalist organization, with a very critical view of the RUC and the Loyal Orders. At the same time, their report on the Loyal Orders, *For God and Ulster*, is the most thoroughly written report I have found and it was unavoidable to rest a great deal on it when writing about the Orders. Material from the Orange Order has been used as well, but their reasons for publishing a website are of course not to take a critical look on the organization but to promote themselves. Of the nationalist residents' groups, the antagonists of the Loyal Orders in the parades issue, none have websites and they have no over-arching organization. Through the Pat Finucane Centre it was, nevertheless, possible to get hold of a report from the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition, which deals thoroughly with the Drumcree parade.

The books that have been most used are *The Troubles* by Tim Pat Coogan, who tells the story of the Troubles from an Irish perspective, *The Fight for Peace* by Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick, who tell the story of the peace process from a British perspective, and *Explaining Northern Ireland* by John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary who analyze all different explanations given to the conflict in Northern Ireland from a clearly academic, and surprisingly neutral, perspective. Tim Pat Coogan is the former editor of the Irish Press and he has written several books on Northern Ireland, the IRA and the Irish struggle for independence. Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick are both British journalists who have been reporting on Northern Ireland a long time, and John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary are both scholars with a deep knowledge of Northern Ireland.

Apart from these three books, a few other books and a number of journal articles by different scholars have been used, to widen the views on the issue.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper deals with political symbolism, and it can then be useful to start looking at symbols. A symbol is, according to the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, "something which represents or suggests something else, such as an idea or quality", or it is "a letter, sign or figure which expresses a sound, operation number, chemical substance, etc" (1987:1071). Elder and Cobb describes it as "any object used by human beings to index meanings that are not inherent in, nor discernible from, the object itself. Literally, anything can become a symbol: a word or a phrase, a gesture or an event, a person, a place, or a thing. An object becomes a symbol when people endow it with meaning, value, or significance" (Elder and Cobb, 1983:29)

Symbols are a means of communication, whether as signs, numbers, acts, gestures or a spoken language, and communication is central to politics. "[T]he questions of who communicates what to whom, how, and with what effects go to the crux of the political process" (Elder and Cobb, 1983:9). Language, our central means of communication, is highly symbolic. Signs in the nature and among animals are considered natural, e.g. leaves turn red in the autumn due to seasonal changes of light conditions, temperature etc, or a happy dog is wagging its tail because of an automatic reflex. The signs of the human language is, on the other hand, to a great extent arbitrary and conventional, i.e. there is no necessary connection between form and content. There does not have to be any causal or

logical relations between the signs and what they refer to (Linell, 1982:15). The Swiss linguist Ferdinand Saussure pointed out this arbitrary nature of the word. There is a union between form and content, but “there is no intrinsic link between form and content” (Warren, 1988:65). Nothing makes the word ‘dog’ better or less suited to denote the animal in question than the Swedish word ‘hund’ does. When we learn a language, we are adjusting ourselves to the conventional rules that have been developed within the language.

There is always a relation, a reference, between the sign and what it refers to; e.g. the word ‘dog’ refers to a certain four-legged animal. There is also a relation between this reference and the interpreter. A sign cannot refer to a phenomenon without someone thinking of this relation (Allwood and Anderson, 1993:43). This triangular relation points out the importance of distinguishing between reference and meaning. Signs could refer to the same thing but have different meanings. A classic example on this is Gottlob Frege’s ‘Morning Star Paradox’. A version of this paradox is:

- ◆ John believes that the Morning Star is a planet in our solar system.
- ◆ John does not believe that the Evening Star is a planet in our solar system.
- ◆ The Morning Star and the Evening Star are the same planet, viz. Venus.
- ◆ Conclusion: John both believes and does not believe that Venus is a planet in our solar system (Warren, 1982:74)

The conclusion above is false as it is based on the assumption that because ‘the Morning Star’ and ‘the Evening Star’ have the same referent, they also mean the same thing. The two expressions refer to the same entity, but they are connected with different contents, and therefore they have the same referent but different meaning (Warren, 1982:74, af Trampe, 1990:22, Allwood and Andersson, 1993:54).

This paradox is not only of use when studying semantics, but Elder and Cobb explain the same thing with political symbols.

The meaning of the message is heavily colored by the significance to the receiver of the symbols involved and his or her own interpretation of their meaning. The same symbols may communicate different things to different people ... This heterogeneity of interpretation is likely to go unrecognized, however, because all are reacting to the same objective stimuli and tend to assume that the meaning they find there is intrinsic to the symbols involved and thus common to all. (1983:10).

Murray Edelman, whose theories are central for the analysis in this paper, claims that the political world is constructed from the manipulation of symbols. Social problems, political leaders and political enemies come out as important symbols for bringing meaning to what Edelman calls “the political spectacle”. These three are all social constructions as they are

created through gestures and discourse that evoke similar perceptions in people who are important to one another, and also because these aspects of the experienced political scene helps create the others. The spectacle assumes different forms for different groups according to their respective concerns and ideologies, so that there are conflicting definitions of problems, enemies, and crises and conflicting meanings for leaders (1985:202).

In this paper we will for example see how a spectacle called the parades issue has turned the concept of men marching down a street dressed in suits, bowler hats and colarettes into a political symbol, and how this symbol has different meaning for different groups. To some people this symbol stands for a traditional and cherished part of a culture, for others it stands for oppression and supremacy. For some people the march is an

exercise of civil rights, for others it is a violation of civil rights. If we assume that the march has the same meaning, this becomes a paradox. But, with Frege's Morning Star paradox in the mind, we know that symbols referring to the same thing, e.g. a marching group of men, still can have different meanings.

Several scholars have pointed out the importance of symbols for collective action, e.g. the historian George Mosse, a refugee from Nazi Germany. Drescher et al. describes Mosse's conception of how "ideas do not take form through formal, rational analyses but through experimentation in the popular arena. Symbols are the means through which political movements develop and ideas are given concrete form" (1982:2). It is, in Mosse's perspective, not only the political organizations that are drawing the masses into the political arena by using these symbols, but cultural creations as festivals, myths, monuments, art, novels, music and theatre play a big part as well.

Sidney Tarrow points at how symbolism "is a tool for the construction of meaning without which it is impossible to mobilize people into action. The challenge is to understand the role that symbolic frames play in relation to the more conventional categories of conflict, power and authority" (1992:54). Elder and Cobb mean that symbols "serve to link the individual to the larger political order and to synchronize the diverse motivations of different individuals, making collective action possible" (1983:1).

Edelman emphasizes that we tend to "dwell on lore about the state: what it is and should be. The lore includes much that is vague, yet comes to have a powerful emotional pull". The lore includes much that is contrary to what we can see happen, but

the myth is more firmly believed and the more dogmatically passed on to others because men want to believe it and it holds them together.... The symbolic side of politics calls for attention, for men cannot know themselves until they know what they do and what surrounds and nurtures them. Man creates political symbols and they sustain and develop him or warp him (1985:1).

To most of us, politics is "a passing parade of abstract symbols" (1985:5). For an individual, the possibilities of influencing this spectacle are very small. And the occasions of popular participation that are most cherished are according to Edelman largely symbolic, for example voting in elections. Issues are a minor determinant of how people vote and most voters are "quite ignorant of what the issues are and of which party stands for what position" (1985:3). Studies of legislative and administrative behaviour also show that these do not depend on election outcomes primarily.

Voting as a largely symbolic action is one of Edelman's favourite examples, and it must be noted that he is resting upon American studies and American voting behaviour. Legislative behaviour is for example in many countries totally dependent on the outcomes of decisive referenda, as in the Republic of Ireland where amendments of the constitution have to be approved in referenda.

However, with a slightly modified view on voting behaviour it can still be argued that voting largely is a ritual action. Edelman does not mean that election campaigns do not have a purpose. But like all ritual, "elections draw attention to common societies and to the importance and apparent reasonableness of accepting the public policies that are adopted. Without some such device no polity can survive and retain the support or acquiescence of its members" (1985:3). Symbols must have a relevance to peoples' lives to be meaningful. If political advocates resort to appeals that do not touch the experiences of the people who are being appealed to, they will most likely be met with indifference. "Symbols become that facet of experiencing the material world that gives it a specific meaning. The language, rituals, and objects to which people respond are not abstract ideas. If they matter at all, it is because they are accepted as basic to the quality of life" (1988:8).

A CONSTRUCTED SPECTACLE

The analysis of this paper is largely based on Murray Edelman's theories on political symbolism as described in *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (1985) and *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (1988). Edelman, just as Elder and Cobb, suffer from the same problem as so many American political scientists – they study only their own political culture and draw conclusions from it, without showing an awareness of cultural proximity. In Edelman's case, this is most noticeable in *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, first published in 1964, where all examples are from the American society. Edelman claims that he is talking about “man in general”, “man as a political animal” etc, which implies a general theory, but he has no examples from any other cultures – he is in fact stating somewhere that things could be different in another culture than the American. This cultural bias together with the fact that women do not seem to exist at all makes it hard to know how much of his theories in this book that really are general.

However, the afterword from 1985 to this book combined with *Constructing the Political Spectacle* give a picture that is less ethnocentric and gender biased. Still, Edelman can sometimes be quite vague and he does not always define his concepts as careful as you would wish as a reader. He is often also taking for granted that the reader is as familiar with things he mentions, as he is himself. This is also something noted in reviews where for example Richard A. Wright says: “My only criticism concerns Edelman's impenetrable writing style – I suspect the book would be hard going for readers unfamiliar with interpretive sociology” (1989:244). William A. Gamson is on the same line of thought when stating that Edelman's analysis

is thin on examples that would enrich his argument and extend his audience beyond the already convinced. He frequently refers to examples in passing rather than presenting them in extended form, showing how the argument provides a different gloss on their usual interpretation ... the absence of elaborated examples makes the book [i.e. *Constructing the Political Spectacle*] much less usable as an introduction to these ideas than books in the same genre. (1988:437-438).

However, most of the criticism of Edelman seems to be directed towards his style of writing and not to the theories as such. His notion of politics as a constructed spectacle is interesting and useful for understanding such entangled conflicts as the one in Northern Ireland. For this paper, we will look at the basic ideas of his theories, and use them for deconstructing the parades spectacle.

In his theories, Edelman focuses on the notion of politics as a constructed spectacle.

The spectacle constituted by news reporting continuously constructs and reconstructs social problems, crises, enemies, and leaders and so creates a succession of threats and reassurances. These constructed problems and personalities furnish the content of political journalism and the data for historical and analytic political studies. They also play a central role in winning support and opposition for political causes and policies Rather than seeing political news as an account of events to which people react, I treat political developments as creations of the publics concerned with them (1988:1-2).

Edelman does not believe in the positivistic interpretations of politics that suggest an observable, objective reality, but he “sees a world of much greater ambiguity in which outcomes vary according to the interplay of political symbols on differently situated individuals” (Bennett, 1993:108). Certain events become social problems because elites define and control reality. Leaders “construct publics by publicizing symbols and language that evoke emotional capacities and commonsense understandings available to individuals, setting up a willingness to accept solutions that follow logically or emotionally from the symbolic framing of problems” (Bennett, 1993:107-108).

THREAT AND REASSURANCE

A central theme to Edelman is the continuing tension between threat and reassurance, which he sees as the basic dichotomy for the mass public.

[E]very political institution and act evokes and reinforces a particular response in its audiences ... For the spectators of the political scene every act contributes to a pattern of ongoing events that spells threat or reassurance ... The very fact that the same act which one grouping favors looms ominously for another reinforces each side in its perception for it seems to make it all more clear that the enemy is really there, fighting against the good life or against life itself (1985:13).

Elder and Cobb also stress the way “the political system provides a surfeit of political communications that are symbolically reassuring to the public” (1983:16). The reassurance promotes consent and reinforces the apprehension that the normal order of things is maintained. “Anxieties aroused in the public can generally be assuaged by a dramatic symbolic gesture that serves to restore popular confidence in the political order and that gives reassurance that the problem is well in hand” (1983:16). The dramatic symbolic gesture, e.g. establishing a new law, is often enough to satisfy the general public, although the original claimants have not gained anything. New laws, reforms etc gives the general public the impression that the problem is solved, even though it has not led to any concrete change of conditions for the group demanding changes. The public is reassured that there is no longer a problem, and continuous demands from the deprived group that the public earlier supported might then turn into a threat.

On the other hand, demands or expectations that go unanswered often grow into discontent that can be developed into activism or alienation. Extraparliamentary mass action or extremist politics are often caused by a lack of symbolic reassurance from the government, i.e. “restiveness occurs when the state is not symbolically aligned with those who feel threatened” (Edelman, 1985:167). Here, there is a key distinction in strategy.

Strikes by workers or farmers and rebellion are optimistic in outlook and are based upon a concerted plan for a changed order. Vigilante action is pessimistic in outlook with no plan for a social order perceived as different or better, but with a continuing need on the part of individuals to discover or create, and then harass, groups perceived as threats (1985:170).

To the vigilante type of mass action, the threat is not based on observable conditions. The goal is a normative category, not a specific empirical state of affairs. Concrete actions or benefits are therefore not enough, but are only confirming the vigilantes of their initial assumptions of the reality of the threat. Symbolic reassurance can calm down the vigilantes, just as changed conditions can reduce the need to discover and attack conspiracies.

Participants in the other type of mass action are instead looking for a new and better world. The symbolic reassurance offered by the state is not good enough as it has the wrong values. Supporters of strikes, rebellions etc “compare their current living standards with better ones and see reason to believe they can achieve the better ones” (1985:169). This kind of mass action often takes place when people have experienced improvement in their living standards that has showed them that improvement is normal and to be expected.

CONSTRUCTING A PROBLEM

Of the troubled conditions prevailing in the modern world, only some become social problems in the political world. "Problems come into discourse and therefore into existence as reinforcements of ideologies, not simply because they are there or because they are important for wellbeing" (Edelman, 1988:12). To define something as a problem is then a way of setting the agenda.

There are reasons for why a troubling condition is labelled with the term "problem" or "crisis". One reason to bring a condition into attention as a problem is to cover the benefits other groups get from the problem, for example when focusing on a minority's persisting problems of unemployment, crime etc, the benefits the majority gets from the discrimination of the minority are hidden.

A problem always reflects an ideology and by bringing it into attention, certain actions are rationalized. Attention to one particular problem might also reduce interest in a different one that could be more of a threat. One way of doing this could be to label an event as a "crisis". Edelman points out that most of the time, problems and crisis are the same things. A crisis is often an episode in a long sequence of similar problems.

In the conventional view ... problems are chronic and crises are acute; but the distinction turns out to be arbitrary when the catalysts of crises are determined A crisis, like all news development, is a creation of the language used to depict it; the appearance of a crisis is a political act, not a recognition of a fact or of a rare situation (1988:31).

CONSTRUCTING LEADERS

Political leaders can be used to symbolize good and evil, whereas historical trends, social conditions and modes of discourse will not. "Leaders become objectifications of whatever worries or pleases observers of the political scene because it is easy to identify with them, support or oppose them, love or hate them" (Edelman, 1988:39). A leader is connoted with innovation, but political leaders must also follow their followers. It is rather the followers who create the leaders than the opposite, and to get a high position it is important to conform to the widely held ideology. "Leaders do not simply manipulate their followers. They are successful in capturing symbolic assent and compliance. People require symbols because they objectify myths and thereby offer participation, identity, and salvation" (Drescher et al., 1982:3).

Edelman also emphasizes that it is usually not the original theorist who becomes a political leader, but the one who adjust to the prevailing ideologies. "Prior ideas ... may sensitize officials to possibilities or to strategies that would not otherwise occur to them, but ... the possibilities in the contemporary situation determine which ideas are appropriate and which must be discarded or altered" (1988:53).

Political leaders, accordingly, appear to be innovative, but most of the time they maintain the status quo. If there is innovation, it comes gradually. When choosing a leader not "specificity but ambiguity is likely to augment a candidate's appeal; and appeal, not ideology, makes a leader useful to a party. Political leaders are most useful when they can represent whatever meaning concerned groups want to see in them" (1988:63).

CONSTRUCTING ENEMIES

A political enemy to some people is to other people an ally or an innocent victim. Enemies give the political spectacle "its power to arouse passion, fears, and hopes" (Edelman, 1988:67). Political enemies can hurt their opponents but often also help them. "Because the evocation of a threatening enemy may win support for its prospective tar-

gets, people construct enemies who renew their own commitment and mobilize allies” (1988:67). When the focus is on the tactic of the opponent, “the world of the game defines the antagonist as an adversary” (1988:67). But when the focus is not on the process but on the character of the opponent, it is rather an enemy than an adversary. “Enemies are characterized by an inherit trait or set of traits that marks them as evil, immoral, warped, or pathological and therefore a continuing threat regardless of what course of action they pursue, regardless of whether they sin or lose in any particular encounter, and even if they take no political action at all” (1988:67).

Enemies are persons, or stereotypes of persons, to whom we can attribute traits, intentions or actions to do or threaten harm. “It is not the harm that matters, but the attribution . . . [e]nimity lies in the eye of beholder” (1988:87).

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PARADES SPECTACLE

In this paper, the analysis focuses on the different meanings the symbols of the parades issue hold for the actors involved. The main actors of the parades issue are the Loyal Orders and the nationalist residents who oppose their marches. However, as this issue mirrors the bigger conflict, the two communities in Northern Ireland, i.e. unionists and nationalists, represented by their political parties and various paramilitary groups are acting in the spectacle. Therefore, it is vital to find out how the parades are interpreted in the two communities, and how the tensions between threat and reassurance are working. While finding different meanings in the symbols, it is also possible to construct different problems. In the analysis, we will look for social Problems or Crises constructed of the symbolism of the parades issue, and what these Problems are to the two different communities. It is also important to try to understand why the parades issue turned into a Problem in 1995.

According to Edelman, not only Problems are constructed by the spectacle but also Leaders and Enemies. In the analysis, the purpose is to identify how Leaders use the parades issue for strengthening their leadership, or maybe even to create it, and how they construct symbolic Enemies.

If an issue symbolizes different problems to different groups, it is to be expected that the groups have different solutions to the problem. The solution of the parades issue is then not the same among nationalists and unionists, and it will be analyzed what kind of solutions the two groups wish for.

The two communities in Northern Ireland are not the only actors in this spectacle. The parades issue has become a spectacle during a peace process in which both the British and Irish governments are highly involved. To both governments, the parades issue is a highly unwelcome problem. The emphasis when looking at the two governments views will be on what kind of Problem the issue is for them and what solution they see for the issue. When looking at the British government, the NIO’s and the RUC’s attitudes to the parades issue will also be analyzed.

As explained before, the media have been excluded as an actor in the parades issue, not because the media are irrelevant, but because of the need to limit the study.

BACKGROUND

People often believe that religion is the main cause of the Northern Irish conflict, and it is a view often-proposed in the media. This view is also found among various scholars. Steve Bruce claims for example that the “Northern Ireland conflict is a religious conflict. Economic and social differences are also crucial, but it was the fact that the competing

populations in Ireland adhered and still adhere to competing religious traditions which has given the conflict its enduring and intractable quality” (1986:249).

McGarry and O’Leary, however, deal thoroughly and persuasively with explaining why religion cannot be seen as being fundamental for the conflict. These scholars show how secularization has had little effect on the conflict:

Measurable levels of religiosity, such as church attendance, are remarkably high in Northern Ireland when compared to elsewhere in western Europe, but the fact is that conflict started, escalated, and has continued while these levels have been declining. Other measures of religious irregularity – of divorces or of children born outside marriage – indicate that Northern Ireland is becoming more secular.... Such ‘secularization’ has not affected the continuing high levels of support for nationalist and unionist political parties (1995:189).

McGarry and O’Leary also point out that neither of the political parties (with a possible exception of the DUP) nor any paramilitary group are religiously labelled (1995:191, 193). Religion is instead “a key ethnic marker, facilitating the residential, marital and educational segregation which helps reproduce the two ethnic/national communities.... It is an analytical mistake to endow the boundary-marker with more significance than the fact that there is a boundary” (1995:212).

The core of the conflict is instead the question of nationality. In McGarry’s and O’Leary’s words:

both communities ... are happy to tolerate the other’s culture, meaning its religion and national culture. What they find problematic is that the state of the other community claims national sovereignty over the territory, and that the other community seeks different political institutions.... Northern Ireland is the site of one fundamental cultural clash: the clash of rival political nationalisms. In the national sovereignty trap, which is not unique to Northern Ireland, there is a deadly belief that each national culture must have one, and only one, political roof for its protection and expression (1995:264).

The partition of Ireland in 1921 recognized the Ulster Protestants’ right of self-determination while giving them the chance to opt out of the Irish Free State. This would have been reasonable if Ulster Protestants only had been left in Northern Ireland. However, even though the three counties of Ulster with largest Catholic majorities were excluded from Northern Ireland, about 30 per cent of the people in the remaining six counties got no ability to exercise their right to self-determination.

Large parts of this area, e.g. Derry, had Catholic majorities, and the way the border was drawn partitioned Ireland in an arbitrary way. The Ulster Protestants could not be said to have had any special territorial claim of nationhood. In fact, they had shown a very pragmatic view on territory, first abandoning three of Ireland’s four provinces as their territory and then abandoning three counties of Ulster.

Northern Ireland and its population have not become a territorial nation either since partition – instead the

border that divides Ireland not only runs between the two states, but, informally through most towns and villages in Northern Ireland There is no convincing case to be made that ‘Northern Ireland’, or six county Ulster represents a territorial nation, either in the exclusive sense – that there is a Protestant national territory validated by history or geography – or in the inclusive sense – that the experience of sixty and more years of devolved self-rule has created a territorial nation embracing all the people on Northern Ireland (Johnston, 1990:14).

Partitioning violated the right of self-determination for the Catholics, and it is not possible to give both communities this right through a new partition of the territory. Al-

though Northern Ireland is a polarized society with most nationalists in the west and most unionists in the east, people are still living too mixed with each other.

Northern Ireland is far from the only place in the world where the concept of the nationstate is not working. Other present examples are Israel/Palestine and Bosnia where two or more nations are living mixed in one territory. It is not possible for both nations to obtain their own nationstate, and it is necessary to find other ways of solving the problem of all nations' right to self-determination.

While combining liberal theory with nationalist theory, Yael Tamir challenges the idea of the nationstate. All nations cannot have its own state, but "all nations are entitled to a public sphere in which they constitute the majority" (1993:150). She distinguishes between national self-determination and self-rule. The individualistic aspect in the case of self-rule points to the right of individuals to govern their lives without being subject to external dictates. In the case of self-determination, the individualistic aspect "concerns the way in which individuals define their personal and national identity" (1993:70). The communal aspect of self-rule places the right of individuals to participate in their country's government at its centre. National self-determination in its communal aspect is the right of individuals to a public sphere where they are entitled to establish institutions and manage their culture.

[N]ational self-determination has little to do with civil rights and political participation. It is a search ... not for Millian freedoms and civil liberties, but for status. This is neither a struggle for the 'equality of legal rights' nor for the 'liberty to do as one wishes,' although one may want these too, but for recognition (1993:71).

With this view on national self-determination, we can look at the two communities in Northern Ireland in a different way. The nationalists feel that their right to national self-determination is flawed as they have not been recognized as Irish and have few means of expressing their culture. The unionists, on the other hand, feel that they would meet the same fate in a united Ireland.

This argumentation goes in line with the ideas of McGarry and O'Leary of how to solve the conflict in Northern Ireland. To apply the traditional way of looking at self-determination, i.e. that a nation should get its state, is not feasible as

the causes of the conflict lie in ethno-national antagonism, waged between two societies and their political organizations, as well as by their respective paramilitaries, in conditions exacerbated by British and Irish political institutions, and by the national sovereignty trap. It follows that no internal settlement, confined to the UK's jurisdiction, can work. Equally no policy of obliging unionists to accept a united Ireland without their consent can work. The national question cannot be by-passed (1995:392).

Ethno-national divisions must be addressed, and "if renewed conflict is to be avoided, let alone resolved, then each community must identify with whatever new political institutions are devised" (1995: 392). McGarry's and O'Leary's vision of Northern Ireland is a bi-cultural society, where both nations will get equal recognition.

Other scholars and political commentators share these ideas, e.g. Robert Kearney who also brings forward ideas of a bi-national cultural identity in Northern Ireland (1997). The peace agreement offers different measures to recognize both the British and Irish national identities, bringing in a so called Irish dimension with cross-border institutions, a power-sharing assembly and greater influence of the Republic of Ireland. The great problem is that territory still is very important for many people in Northern Ireland. To hard-lined republicans there is nothing less than a united Ireland, which is the solution unionists fear most.

However, present-day conflicts must be put in its historical context, and consequently we will have a quick look at the historical background to the conflict in Northern Ireland.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The root of the sectarian conflict is found in the 17th century, when Scottish and Northern English Presbyterians migrated to Ulster, the northern of Ireland's four provinces. As their land was taken from the Irish, who were Catholics, the relations between the newcomers and the original Ulster inhabitants did not get a good start. The different religions and the fight over land set the two groups against each other.

Since the Norman invasion in the 12th century, the Irish have repeatedly struggled for independence. In 1921, the Irish managed to bring Britain to the negotiation table, as the first of the British colonies to get its independence. Nevertheless, as Home Rule, a kind of devolution, had been discussed since the end of the 19th century, the Protestants in Ulster were prepared and they refused to join the free state that was to be set up. Consequently, Ireland was partitioned, and to secure a Protestant majority in the north-east, only six of Ulster's nine counties remained in the union with Britain.

The Free State started its existence with a civil war, as disagreement about the Treaty was great, especially about partition and that a free state did not mean full independence. The Free Staters won the civil war and since then the south of Ireland has been peaceful. In 1937, a new constitution was set up that claimed the whole of Ireland as part of the nation, and in 1949 the Republic of Ireland was declared. The Roman Catholic Church has had a very strong position in the Republic of Ireland, and has had great influence over legislation for example.

Poverty and emigration have been serious problems in the Republic, but the country has gained a great deal from its EU membership. Now the economy is booming like never before with the tourist and computer industry flourishing. The country is also becoming increasingly secularized although the Catholic Church still is very influential.

The Northern Ireland state started off with serious sectarian riots, repeated in the 1930s. Apart from that, and from the IRA's so called border campaign in 1956-62, the province was relatively peaceful with the Unionist Party ruling in a majority secured by gerrymandering. The peace was broken, however, at the start of the troubled time that has come to be called the Troubles.

THE TROUBLES

In the 1960's, a civil rights movement started in Northern Ireland on the issues of universal local government franchise, and discrimination in the allocation of public housing. The movement, that soon became nationalist in character, started in Derry and introduced new features in Northern Ireland. "[I]t was not merely the idea of marching for civil rights that was new, it was the idea of Catholics marching. Marching in the Six-Counties was something that the Orangemen did of right and the Catholics on sufferance, and in designated areas" (Coogan, 1996a:70).

The idea behind the civil rights movement was to change the old order and create a better society for all. Edelman points out that this kind of movement often occurs when there have been improvements in living conditions, which is true also of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland. There had been some reforms, e.g. an education reform that gave children from poor families an opportunity to go to university. And the leaders of the movement were largely Catholics who had benefited from this reform.

However, the unionists did not approve of Catholics taking to the roads. Some of

them felt that the reforms threatened the old order, and the group they picked out for harassment was the civil rights activists. Ian Paisley, now leader of the DUP, organized counter-demonstrations. The RUC halted the civil rights marchers instead of the Paisleyites, or stopped the civil rights activists in brutal ways.

In January 1969, a march from Belfast to Derry were attacked several times on their way without the RUC intervening, and when they arrived in Derry riots broke out. The rest of the year saw tension over marches and more riots. Before the annual Apprentice Boys Day march in Derry on August 12, barricades had been put up in the Bogside, a nationalist working-class area. And just as the Bogside riots precipitated, the march ended in riots. They continued for several days, and the Battle of the Bogside spread to Belfast. In Belfast, the fighting was even more severe, with many houses being burnt down in nationalist areas and guns being used. The IRA hardly existed at this time, and the nationalist areas in Belfast that were attacked by loyalist mobs were protected by a few remaining IRA-men with guns. After two days of fighting, the British army was sent over. The army was meant to be there temporarily, but has stayed since.

During July, August and September this year, the disorder is said to have caused 1,505 Catholic families and 315 Protestant families to flee their homes (Coogan, 1996a:91). The Irish government set up refugee camps along the border, and “a Community Relations Commission report established that some 60,000 people were forced to leave their homes between the summer of 1969 and February 1973” (Coogan, 1996a:92).

Much of the nationalists’ resentment towards the Orange marches could very likely be traced back to this time. Most nationalist and republican leaders today were involved either in the civil rights movement or in the IRA when it was mobilized. Others from the civil rights movement are influential in the media. Memories from this time are an important part of the nationalist mind.

August -69 started the Troubles, a quarter of a century of violence in Europe. The IRA mobilized and split, the British army that was seen by the nationalists as saviours when they arrived soon became an enemy and various different loyalist paramilitary organizations countered the republican violence.

On January 30 1972, British paratroopers opened fire in Derry on a march against internment, killing 13 of the marchers and giving Derry its Bloody Sunday (there was a Bloody Sunday in Dublin in 1920), an event that is deep into nationalists’ minds. British governments have denied that the paratroopers opened fire at unarmed demonstrators, and not until this year was an inquiry open into this sensitive event.

Later in 1972, the British government imposed direct rule from Westminster. Stormont, the Northern Irish parliament created when Ireland was partitioned in 1921, has not been in function since then. In 1974, there was an attempt to set up a power-sharing executive for Northern Ireland based on the Sunningdale Agreement from 1973, but it was brought down by a general strike by unionist workers (The Ulster Worker’s Council). There have been a number of unsuccessful ceasefires, but the Northern Irish society has throughout the years become increasingly polarized.

In the early 1980s, Northern Ireland was again brought close to the brink. Republican prisoners in the Long Kesh prison south of Belfast (later renamed to the Maze) went on hunger strike in 1981 after several years of protests to achieve status as prisoners of war. Ten of the hunger strikers starved themselves to death before the British government made some concessions. The hunger strike had a significant symbolic effect. The republican movement got an immense public support and consequently started to organize itself politically through Sinn Féin to a much greater extent than before.

In 1985, the British and the Irish government set up the Anglo-Irish Agreement, securing a role for the Republic of Ireland in the future of Northern Ireland. There were massive protests from unionists opposing the agreement, but the agreement held despite

this. In August 1994, the IRA called a ceasefire, soon followed by the loyalist paramilitaries. Northern Ireland saw peace for the first time in 25 years.

Through this time of Troubles, it is obvious that the strategies for mass action among nationalists and unionists respectively have followed Edelman's dichotomy. Nationalists have concentrated on movements for change, like the civil rights movement. Reforms have not given them enough reassurance to be content but they have asked for more reforms and for a change of the old order.

Unionists, on the other hand, have concentrated on vigilante action, strongly opposed to any change. While bringing down, or trying to bring down, agreements that would give greater recognition to the nationalists, they have offered no alternatives. The action has been aimed at what have been perceived as threats towards the unionists' position, a position that is just as Edelman describes "a normative category and not a specific empirical state of affairs" (1985:168). It is not necessary to be a Marxist to conclude that the Protestant working class probably have more in common with the Catholic working-class, than with Protestant middle and upper class. Many Protestants live in the same deprivation as many Catholics, but Ulster Protestants still see themselves as something special, with a special position in the UK.

THE PEACE PROCESS

The peace process did not start in 1994, but quite a few years earlier. At the same time as the IRA, the UVF and the UDA intensified their campaigns in the early 1990s, nationalist leaders were set towards talking. John Hume, SDLP, and Gerry Adams, Sinn Féin, started talks with each other, through the mediation of a Redemptorist priest, Fr Alec Reid from West Belfast. Fr Alec Reid has turned out to be one of the most important persons behind the peace process, not only brokering talks between Gerry Adams and John Hume, but also organizing meetings between the republican movement and the Irish and British governments respectively.

The talks resulted in joint statements, symbolic handshakes etc. A statement of high significance was the Downing Street Declaration, a joint statement from the British and Irish government. It was presented in December 1993, and once again confirmed what the Anglo-Irish agreement already had said – that it is up to the people of Northern Ireland to decide what nationstate to belong to, i.e. a majority can vote Northern Ireland out of the union with Britain.

Throughout the years of talks up to the ceasefires in 1994, unionists played a small part. Apart from the loyalist paramilitaries and their political wings (the PUP and the UDP) who stood behind the ceasefire in 1994, and some Protestant church-leaders who were involved in writing the Downing Street Declaration, unionists were hardly included at all. The peace process was during the prelude to the ceasefires mainly a work between nationalist politicians in Northern Ireland and Taoiseach Albert Reynolds and his government, and to a smaller extent the British government (Mallie and McKittrick, 1997).

For unionists, used to the British government dealing with Northern Ireland through them, the Anglo-Irish Agreement negotiated behind their backs had been a hard enough blow. It was an even greater shock when it was revealed in November 1993 that the British government secretly had negotiated with the republican movement for three years, negotiations that had been so secret that not even the Irish government and the NIO had been informed. The British government insisted that the talks had started in February 1993, but there is quite clear evidence that Sinn Féin's version of the so-called back-channel is more correct. (Mallie and McKittrick, 1997:232-255).

The traditional unionist parties were, accordingly, left outside during these important negotiations leading to the ceasefires. Unionist leaders were often suspicious of the peace

process, as it “served to focus attention on Hume, Adams and the Irish governments, all of whom Unionists saw as their opponents”. Another reason was that some “of the leading Unionist politicians were by instinct confrontational, regarding politics as a field of conflict: over the years they had become almost comfortable with the violence and seemed nervous about how they would cope with a peaceful Northern Ireland” (Mallie and McKittrick, 1997:269).

Finally, in August 1994, the IRA called a ceasefire, followed in October by the CLMC calling a ceasefire on behalf of the UVF and the UDA. However, the British government and the mainstream unionist parties – not the PUP and the UDP – did not accept Sinn Féin in the peace talks unless the IRA decommissioned their arms, a precondition not mentioned before the ceasefires. The IRA refused decommission before settlement, the peace talks came to a deadlock and remained so until the IRA broke its ceasefire in February 1996. In July 1996, the disorder caused by the Drumcree stand-off reinforced the polarization of the society, and during spring 1997 the peace process was at a total standstill because of the British general election.

The general election resulted in a change of government. The new labour government got a large majority and did not have to rely on unionist votes in Westminster, as the previous conservative government did. Dr Mo Mowlam became the first woman Northern Secretary, and she immediately went to Northern Ireland. She was warmly welcomed by both unionists and nationalists and few doubted that she was genuinely interested in achieving peace.

The Republic of Ireland also had a general election, resulting in a new coalition government led by Fianna Fáil, with Bertie Ahern as Taoiseach. Fianna Fáil have traditionally been the more nationalist party compared to Fine Gael. The former Taoiseach Albert Reynolds was one of the main architects of the peace process, but had to go because of a scandal. His government was followed by a Fine Gael led coalition, and even though the Taoiseach John Bruton continued Reynolds’ work, he was considered by nationalists to take too much consideration to the unionists.

With two new governments, both promising to give high priority to the peace process, the only thing really needed for a working peace process was a new IRA ceasefire. During a turbulent summer, when tensions were high because of the Loyal Order’s marches and the small paramilitary groups’ activities, the IRA surprisingly called a new ceasefire on July 21.

The talks went on, led by the American Senator George Mitchell, and the ceasefires have held so far, even though they have been shaky. The deadline for the talks was set to April 9, Holy Thursday, and this last week of the talks became one of the most nervous weeks in Irish history. David Trimble of the UUP turned down Mitchell’s proposal, and negotiations continued all through Good Friday when it was finally announced that an agreement had been reached. By then, neither the UUP nor Sinn Féin wanted to accept the agreement without letting their members have a say. The UUP endorsed it shortly afterwards with a minority voting no to it, and Sinn Féin endorsed it a month later. On May 22, referenda will be held on the agreement in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

The Good Friday Agreement is a very complicated and ambiguous agreement. Unionists supporting it claim that it strengthens the union, whereas nationalists claim that it is a step towards a united Ireland. The main points of it is a power-sharing assembly with an executive made up by the different parties in the assembly, cross-border institutions and greater recognition of British and Irish nationalities.

However, it must be kept in mind that even if the agreement will be endorsed in the referenda, only the largest paramilitary groups are on ceasefire. The UVF, the INLA and the CIRA are all against the peace process and have been active in several sectarian mur-

ders during this year, especially the LVF. And the polarization of the Northern Irish society is still deep, which is shown by the importance the parades issue has got since the summer of 1995. To understand what the parades issue is about, it is necessary to look at the Loyal Orders and their marching tradition.

THE LOYAL ORDERS

The Loyal Orders is a collective term for the various institutions of semi-secret, pro-Protestant organizations that have played a crucial part in Northern Ireland's history and are the protagonists of the parades issue. The largest order is the Orange Order, founded in 1795 after the Battle of the Diamond, a sectarian land dispute. The Orange Order is a worldwide institution, and in the countries where it exists, it is represented by a Grand Lodge. It is unclear how many members the Orange Order has. The Pat Finucane Centre notes that "the standard estimate of the Orange Order is put at around 100,000. The real figure may be around half that number" (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:7). According to George Patton, Executive Officer of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, the Orange Order has about 70,000 members in Northern Ireland, but the Order does not keep a central membership list due to security reasons (1998). The North Report (the independent review on parades made after Drumcree 1996) also estimates membership to about 70-75,000 (1997).

The Order is open to male Protestants. There is a women's lodge that according to the Pat Finucane Centre "in essence ... have been delegated to making the tea and sandwiches on the Twelfth" (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:12). To become a member, it is necessary to promise that you were born by Protestant parents, were educated as a Protestant, your wife is a Protestant and you have never been connected with the Roman Catholic church (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:5). The Order also "prohibits members participating in any Roman Catholic religious ceremony, including marriage and funerals" (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995:186).

The Apprentice Boys of Derry was formed in 1814, and its principle aims was at the formation to commemorate the two most important events of the siege of Derry, which began in December 1688 with the Closing of the Gates by the Apprentice Boys and the Relief of the City the following August. These two events are still the focus of the organization.

Other institutions within the Loyal Orders are the Royal Black Perceptory, the Royal Arch Purple Order and the Junior Loyal Orange Lodge. Cross-membership between the Orders is common (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:9-15).

The Loyal Orders often stress their cultural and religious aspects, but it is obvious that the Orders have been and are still very political. Since the end of the 19th century, the Orange Order has been linked to the UUP. The Apprentice Boys are connected with the UUP and since the mid-70s also with the DUP. During the Stormont years 1921-1972, each of the six prime ministers were Orangemen, as were all but three Cabinet Ministers between 1921-1969. All unionist senators between 1921-1969 were with one exception Orangemen (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:24). The marches of the Orders have also been bearing political marks.

The Pat Finucane Centre stresses the social role of the orders. The 'Protestant community' is made up of several different churches (Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, Free Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, Quakers and other smaller churches and congregations). Since their formation the Orders have been used to link members of these different denominations together, and it has not only been a political unity. "The Loyal Orders have traditionally functioned as providers of services, as organisations which 'bond' the local community (most especially the males) and as a link between past and present"

(1997a:31). The local Orange hall continues to play a role in the social life, especially in rural areas.

Although the Orders have not formally encouraged any loyalist paramilitary group, there seems to have been relationships between some of the members of Orders and paramilitaries. One of the most recent is the relationship between Billy Wright – leader of Mid-Ulster UVF and later leader of the LVF before he was killed in December 1997 – and some members of the Portadown District Orange Lodge. Billy Wright was helping the Orangemen to build barricades during the Drumcree stand-off in 1995, and during the stand-off in 1996 he was consulting with members from the lodge, including David Trimble. Meanwhile, Wright's colleagues in the MID-Ulster UVF murdered a Catholic taxi-driver and the CLMC ordered Wright to leave the country. A rally was held to support the local hero and Wright was joined on the platform by William McCrea, then DUP MP for Mid-Ulster and an Apprentice Boy, and the Worshipful Master Harold Gracey of the Portadown District Lodge (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:35-36; Coogan, 1996a:515-518; Judge, 1997).

The Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition (1996) also points out how Wright on several occasions was involved in the stand-offs in Drumcree both in 1995 and 1996, and that there were threats of violence from the Mid-Ulster Brigade of the UVF, a group supposed to be on ceasefire then. In 1997, threats from the LVF were a main reason not to ban the march.

One manifestation of the ambiguous relationship between the Loyal Orders and paramilitaries is the so-called blood and thunder bands. The Orders use to argue that bandsmen often are not members of the Loyal Orders and attempts are made to control their conduct, for example not carrying paramilitary flags. However, this still happens. This is especially true of the band parades that are outside the control of the Orders (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:37). In the band parade I saw in Kilkeel, Co. Down, in August 1997, I saw both an LVF flag and a UVF flag. Most of the flags carried were rolled up tightly and it is possible that there were more paramilitary flags. This parade was not organized by the Orange Order, but the bands started at the local Orange hall.

The last few years have seen tensions within the Orange Order. After the first Drumcree standoff in 1995 a hard-lined pressure group called the Spirit of Drumcree was formed. The group is discontented with the lack of democracy within the Order, and is opposing re-routing of parades and negotiations with residents.

The Orders themselves claim their tolerance and spirit of religious freedom. However, the institutions are obviously very patriarchal, exemplified by for example the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland saying that “the Order has a world-wide membership and ... wherever its Lodges exist there is to be found a brotherhood of men pledged to uphold the ancient concept of the Protestant faith and liberty under the law” (Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, 1997b:1). The tolerance can be questioned as well, as it has happened on several occasions that members have been expelled because they have visited a Catholic Church or had children who have married Catholics. The ‘brotherly bond’ that the Derrycorry Lodge is talking about, “those things we share in common and hold dear are much more important than things which may divide us” (Derrycorry Purple Guards, 1997a:1), seems to be a bond between Protestant males in the first hand.

However, it should be remembered that many of the cultural and social parts of the Orders are worth respect. Many members have never approved of paramilitary violence and the Drumcree controversies are not appreciated by all. It should further be remembered that only a minority of the unionists are members of any Loyal Order.

THE MARCHING TRADITION

The Loyal Orders are best known to the outside world for their marching tradition. All groups in Northern Ireland are marching, but most marches are organized by the Loyal Orders. Very few of the great amount of marches that are in fact contentious, which can be seen in Tables 1-3. Most of the marches are peaceful events.

Table 1. Number of parades in 1995

<i>Category</i>	<i>Loyalist</i>	<i>Nationalist</i>	<i>Other</i>
Legal	2547	285	617
Illegal	7	17	0
Total	2581	302	617
Re-routed	13	7	0
Conditions imposed	0	2	0
Disorder	11	2	0

Table 2. Number of parades in 1996

<i>Category</i>	<i>Loyalist</i>	<i>Nationalist</i>	Other
Legal	2398	218	527
Illegal	8	11	0
Total	2406	229	527
Re-routed	22	2	1
Conditions imposed	6	0	1
Disorder	15	0	0

Table 3. Number of parades in 1997

<i>Category</i>	<i>Loyalist</i>	<i>Nationalist</i>	<i>Other</i>
Legal	2349	180	296
Illegal	0	5	1
Total	2349	185	297
Re-routed	18	1	0
Conditions imposed	10	1	1
Disorder	3	0	0

Source for all 3 tables: RUC, <http://www.ruc.police.uk/>, assessed on 8/1/98

The parades have different functions, some are for example connected with religious services and others are commemoration of historical events. When marching, the Orangemen dress up with collarettes, bowler hats and white gloves, and they carry symbolic swords, banners etc. Most often, they are joined by bands, consisting of drummers and flute players or accordion players.

Every band use to have a Lambeg drum, a huge drum unique for the loyalist tradition. It originates from large war drums, used in battle “to put heart into the troops and to transmit orders”. It was brought to Ulster with King William III and in 1870 the modern Lambeg drum was developed in Lambeg, near Lisburn. Preparing for the Twelfth, the drummers meet in the local Orange hall for a week, playing every night. It is necessary to learn the rhythms to beat out properly, as each “local area has a distinctive beat” (The Derrycurry Purple Guards, 1997b:1). Catholics north and south of the border often remark that the reason to use the Lambegs in the parades were to frighten the life out of

the Catholics, and anyone who has heard a Lambeg on close distance knows that the sound is tremendous.

The Orders march from Easter to September, with July 12 as the highlight. This is a commemoration of the Battle of the Boyne when, in 1690, William III of Orange with his Protestant forces conquered James II and his Catholic forces. Next to the Twelfth of July, the Twelfth of August is the most important date, when the Apprentice Boys of Derry celebrate one of the most significant events in unionist history, The Siege of Derry. This day leads us to two of the most central notions of unionist culture, viz. 'No Surrender' and the traitor Lundy.

When Derry City was besieged in 1688 by James II and his Catholic forces the governor of Derry, Colonel Lundy, decided to surrender and opened the gates of the city wall. However, 13 Protestant apprentice boys threw out Lundy and closed the gates before James II and his forces entered the city. Derry held out through the siege and James II had to give up in August 1689. 1690 he was finally defeated at the Battle of the Boyne. Since then, 'No Surrender' has been the battle cry of the unionists, and Lundy is the term for a traitor. For example, a large banner put up by the unionist majority in the city council as a protest against the Anglo-Irish agreement was still hanging on Belfast City Hall saying 'No Surrender' several years after the agreement was signed.

During the Apprentice Boys Day, ten thousands of loyal lodges and bands travel to Derry to march along the city walls of a city that always had a nationalist majority. Until 1968, "the marchers annually gathered on the west wall and some threw pennies down on to Catholic houses built close to the walls in Nailor's Row" (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997b:2). The last time before 1995 that the Apprentice Boys marched the complete walls was in 1969, the march that led to the Battle of the Bogside.

Things seem to have calmed down in Derry though, compared to the time of the civil rights movement, and both the Bogside residents and sections of the Apprentice Boys seem to be interested in finding accommodation. The residents are not opposing the march as such, but they do not want the Apprentice Boys to march along the west wall. In a report on the disturbances around the parade in 1995 written by the Pat Finucane Centre, it turns out that many of the marchers who were abusing onlookers and residents, throwing bottles etc, were Apprentice Boys or bands from other parts of Northern Ireland. Several times in the report it is stressed that the marchers responsible for the abusive behaviour are a significant minority.

The two other main flashpoints today are Garvaghy Road in Portadown, Co. Armagh, and Lower Ormeau Road in south Belfast. In Portadown, there have been disturbances connected with parades since the 19th century, and in the early 1980s opposition built up to Orange parades passing down the Obins Street and Tunnel areas of Portadown. The RUC re-routed these parades down the Garvaghy Road, then a mixed area, but now predominantly nationalist. In 1995, the RUC stopped the march from Drumcree church back to the city centre and the Orangemen sat down at the church for a three-day stand-off – the beginning of the infamous Drumcree disorders.

In 1992, five Catholics were killed by the UDA in a bookies shop on the Lower Ormeau Road. That July Orangemen marched "past the site of the killings and some of the marchers gave five-fingered salutes in mockery of the five dead" (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:29). The Catholics on Lower Ormeau Road feel offended by the marchers, and the last few years marches have been forced through by the security forces with the residents locked into their homes.

The Orange order claims that their routes are "not picked to cause offence, but by and large are main arterial routes along which successive generations of Orangemen have peacefully paraded" (Grand Orange Lodge, 1997:2). But many nationalists feel offended whatever the Orangemen's intentions are. Besides, the traditional part of the routes can

be questioned. The Garvaghy Road estates were built in the 60s and 70s, and as told before, marches that used to be held in other areas of Portadown have been re-routed here. The Apprentice Boys parade on August 12 traditionally included the whole city walls and then passed through Waterloo Place and down Strand Road to Culmore on the west bank for a final rally. But the Protestant population has declined on the west bank of Derry, and the current route of the main parade now takes place on the Waterside, on the east bank (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997b:2).

DRUMCREE

Garvaghy Road in Portadown and Lower Ormeau Road in Belfast are areas that used to be mixed, but as Northern Ireland is getting more and more polarized these two areas are now nationalist. Marches along Garvaghy Road have been contentious for many years, and in July 1995 a march was stopped by the RUC at the Drumcree church in Portadown as residents from Garvaghy Road were blocking the road. The march, held annually on the Sunday before the Twelfth, is a march from Portadown city centre to the Drumcree church where the Orangemen attend a service. On the way back to the city centre, the march goes back along Garvaghy Road.

After a three-day standoff, a compromise was brokered and the Orangemen were allowed to march in silence. Later, this event came to be called Drumcree I. The behaviour of unionist leaders afterwards, triumphantly declaring that there had been no compromise but a victory for the Orangemen, made compromise the year after very hard to broker (Browne, 1996). As the Orange Order also has refused to negotiate with the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition as long as their spokesperson is Breandán Mac Cionnaith, a former republican prisoner, compromise seems to be unreachable.

Accordingly, there was a Drumcree II in 1996. The march was stopped again by the RUC, with a new standoff at the church and serious disorder. Loyalist mobs all over Northern Ireland rioted as a result, intimidating Catholic families and blocking roads. This meant that several towns were put under siege, bus and rail services were cancelled and tourists hurriedly left Northern Ireland. After four days, the RUC let the Orangemen march through although no compromise had been brokered, and shortly after a march on the Lower Ormeau Road was forced through by the RUC despite protests from the residents there. This led to nationalist riots, especially serious in Derry, and uproar all over Ireland with the Taoiseach John Bruton and the Catholic Primate in Ireland, Cardinal Cahal Daly, being very severe in their criticism of the British government and the RUC. The RUC was also criticized for having hit back much harder towards the nationalist rioters, than towards the loyalists during the standoff.

About 40 Catholic families left their homes during this period because of intimidation, over 6,000 plastic bullets were fired towards rioters, 2 persons were killed and many people were injured. The society became more polarized as a result and many nationalists began to boycott small businesses owned by loyalists. An independent review of the marching issue was set up by the British government (the North Report), and the result was presented at the beginning of 1997, with suggestions of solutions to the problem, e.g. an independent parades commission. However, due to the British general election, little with the parades issue until the new government took place.

The prospects for the summer looked bleak, but Mo Mowlam promised to do everything she could to solve the issue. The Drumcree march was the most dreaded, and Mowlam promised the Garvaghy Road residents that she would tell them personally in advance of her decision about the march.

Until a few hours before the parade took place, most people thought it would be banned. British troops were setting up barricades as to prevent sympathizing loyalists to

join the Orangemen at Drumcree. However, in the middle of the night, this turned out to be a fraud and the troops moved the barricades to Garvaghy Road instead, preventing residents to get to the road, some to get to their own houses and all to go to their church for Mass. The few protesters that managed to get out on the road were brutally taken away. The march was again forced through against the residents' wishes.

This was bad enough for Mowlam's position among nationalists, but things got even worse when a document was leaked from the NIO showing that a decision on letting the march through was taken already on June 20 (the march was on July 6). Mowlam's loss of credibility among nationalists was huge.

Apart from Mowlam's broken promise and this fatal document, the RUC Chief Constable Ronnie Flanagan stated as an explanation to why the march had not been banned that it had been the 'least worse of the two options'. The worse option would have been to ban the march and risk paramilitary violence from the LVF, who had threatened to kill people in the Republic of Ireland if the march was banned. Thus, just as in 1996, the British authorities bowed to the threat of force.

The march being let through was seen as a victory by the Orangemen, but international observers and visiting TD's were very critical of the way the security forces treated the protesting residents. Drumcree III led not unexpectedly to riots, and there were great worries about what would happen during the Twelfth of July marches. But, this summer something very unusual happened and the Orange Order cancelled or re-routed the four most controversial marches. This wise decision led to a peaceful Twelfth of July, but the decision was not taken because of accommodation had been reached with the nationalist residents. Instead, Chief Constable Ronnie Flanagan warned the Orange Order of the risk they were taking. The IRA had not started their new ceasefire yet, and both the INLA and the CIRA could be expected to react towards the marches.

On the Apprentice Boys Day, the IRA had renewed their ceasefire, and the Bogside Residents Group did not object against the march in Derry, only against the so called feeder marches (a feeder march is a march held by bands and lodges in their hometown before they travel to the main event in for example Derry, and some of these marches were planned in controversial areas). The Loyal Orders marched in Derry, the Bogside Residents went out to look at the marches to show their good will and the day went on with only some disturbances.

A SPECTACLE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY

The last few years have seen great changes in Northern Ireland. The most obvious changes are the ceasefires that have given the Northern Irish people long periods of peace for the first time in 25 years. But there are more changes than paramilitaries putting down their arms for politics, and these changes are just as important.

CHANGING DEMOGRAPHY

It has been said for long that Northern Ireland's population consists of two-thirds of Protestants and one-third of Catholics. However, this is not a true picture any longer, and it is likely that it has not been that for quite some time. The 1971 and the 1981 censuses in Northern Ireland were disrupted by the IRA who regarded the enumerators as potential spies, and the result of this can be seen in the high figure of those who did not wish to state their religion in 1981 (see Table 4). This masked the fact that Catholics made up a growing percentage of Northern Ireland's population already before the 90s. Because of the earlier disruption, the 1991 census presents the first trustworthy figures

for the shifts in population in over twenty years (Coogan, 1996a:513-14, McGarry and O'Leary, 1995:179).

Cultural Catholics are now estimated to be 42-43 per cent. Studies have shown that the group not stating any religion is mainly Catholic (Coogan, 1996b). Catholics are in a majority under the age of 15 and are almost equal in the 15-20 group. Protestants are also to a larger extent emigrating from Northern Ireland than Catholics are. These figures show that "it is as certain as anything that the next decade will show a marked growth in the Catholic population with a corresponding effect in the numbers supporting nationalist parties" (Coogan, 1996b).

Table 4. Religious denominations in Northern Ireland, 1961-1991

<i>Denomination</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1981</i>	<i>1991</i>
Roman Catholic	35	31	29	38
Presbyterian	29	28	24	21
Church of Ireland (Anglican)	24	23	20	18
Methodist	5	5	4	4
Other Protestant denominations	4	5	7	8
Not stated	2	9	20	8
Atheists/Agnostics/None	n/a	n/a	0	4

Source: McGarry, John and Brendan O'Leary (1995) *Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images*. Oxford and Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Tim Pat Coogan shows in the Irish Times how the changes are not only a question of numbers, but also of attitudes. He compares the two areas the Falls and the Shankill in Belfast, two of the most famous and symbolic nationalist and unionist ghettos.

Once, the Shankill automatically got whatever jobs were going. Now there is depression and unemployment in the area. On the Falls Road there is also unemployment, but there is also a tangible optimism and vibrancy, a confidence born out of the years of struggle. This new, head-up attitude is common to nationalists everywhere in the North, mirroring what exists in the Republic today (Coogan, 1996b).

This change is seen in the universities as well. Thirty years ago, Queen's University in Belfast was about 15 per cent Catholic, but is today 65 per cent Catholic. The Protestants instead send their children to British universities, "thus depriving both their class of the elite of the future and contributing to Protestant emigration" (Coogan, 1996b).

These demographic changes will naturally affect voting pattern. The growth in the Catholic population will lead to a corresponding growth in people supporting nationalist parties. This is already a fact, with nationalist parties, especially Sinn Féin, benefiting from the shift of electoral power. Many local councils, especially in the western parts of Northern Ireland, have had nationalist majorities for some time. Protestants are not only moving from Northern Ireland, but they are also moving within Northern Ireland, to the east counties of Antrim and Down. But even here, nationalists are on the fore. In the local elections in 1997, Sinn Féin got the largest number of votes in Belfast (situated between Antrim and Down) and the city council got its first nationalist mayor.

The British general election in May 1997 showed both the success for nationalist parties and the fragmentation among the unionist parties. The UUP still got the highest percentage of votes, but the next two largest parties were the SDLP and Sinn Féin. The DUP, the next largest unionist party, got in percentage fewer votes than Sinn Féin did. The UK Unionist Party, the PUP and the UDP are still very small but they are attracting an increasing share of the vote. The local elections that followed shortly in Northern Ireland showed the same picture.

UNIONIST ALIENATION

The changing demography is one threat towards traditional unionism in Northern Ireland. Another issue turned up the last few years is unionist alienation. The loss of majorities in local councils has caused the unionists to claim that they are subjected to 'ethnic cleansing'. It is true that many unionists are moving to unionist dominated areas because of intimidation from nationalists, but exactly the same thing is happening to nationalists. It is something both communities are subject of, but the intimidation forcing unionists out of nationalist areas adds to the feelings of alienation unionists have.

This is shown for example by a qualitative study consisting of personal interviews with Protestants by Dunn and Morgan. Many of them feel "unease and uncertainty that can be described as Protestant alienation" (p. 184). Bruce has also made personal interviews, with Protestant evangelicals and loyalist paramilitaries, and just as with Dunn's and Morgan's study, the central reason for the feelings of alienation is that Protestants are disadvantaged in comparison with Catholics.

In Bruce's study, it is evident that what many of his interviewees regret having lost is the status of supremacy. Their position in the Northern Irish society is no longer as privileged as it used to be, and the British government has made many concessions to the nationalists' demands for a more equal society. However, even though "Catholics have made great strides psychologically and politically, they have made far fewer gains economically than the Protestants generally imagine" (Coogan, 1996a:429). The problem here is, nevertheless, not the empirical state of affairs, but the threat felt towards unionism as such and the lack of symbolic reassurance from Britain.

Another important part of the unionist alienation is the lack of initiatives in the peace process. Many people have been involved in the peace process, but the leaders of the largest unionist parties were missing from the whole process up to the ceasefires in 1994. However, the lack of initiatives in the peace process from unionist party leaders is also understandable. The peace talks have all the time been meant to result in an agreement including a greater Irish dimension. What the unionists fear most is a united Ireland, and any increase of the Irish dimension is seen as a step towards this. The peace process then has not much to give to unionists. Apart from the prospect of peace of course.

Further, unionists have not been very successful in explaining their case to an international opinion. They often complain about nationalists being better on marketing themselves, for example with a range of films with a nationalist perspective being launched the last few years such as *The Crying Game*, *In the Name of the Father*, *Michael Collins* and *Some Mother's Son*.

Adrian Guelke argues that Northern Ireland is seen as illegitimate by an international opinion as according to accepted international norms of self-determination, political units governed as colonies should be decolonized intact rather than partitioned. Therefore, the "overwhelming weight of world opinion" favours a united Ireland (Guelke, 1988:3). As unionists recognize this, they "tend to be hostile towards international organisations and sympathetic to those resisting the demands of the world community such as South Africa and Israel, while nationalists tend to identify strongly with world opinion on such issues" (Guelke, 1988:18). That unionists feel alienated from the world outside Northern Ireland is then both because they feel that the world community is against them, and that they are themselves hostile to the world community.

ALIENATED FROM BRITAIN

The unionists consider themselves loyal to the union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, but in Britain there is very little loyalty towards Northern Ireland. As Gallagher points out, British governments have stated in the Sunningdale Agreement 1973, in the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 and the Downing Street Declaration in 1993, that Northern Ireland could vote itself out of the UK and into a united Ireland. “Such a declaration ... was a clear sign that the people of Northern Ireland were not regarded as an integral or indispensable part of the nation, and even the most obtuse or trusting unionists could hardly fail to develop a suspicion that Britain would not be sorry to be rid of them” (Gallagher, 1995:722).

Bruce gives an example on how Sir Patrick Mayhew, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, in an interview with the German newspaper *Die Zeit*, said:

‘Many people believe that we would not want to release Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom. To be entirely honest – with pleasure.’ He immediately backtracked and added: ‘No, not with pleasure, I take that back’, and then repeated the orthodox line: ‘But we would not stand in the way of Northern Ireland, if that would be the will of the majority’. However, that he strongly hoped it was the will of the majority was made clear when he went on to say: ‘The province cost us three billion pounds per year. Three billion pounds for one and a half million people’ (Bruce, 1994:66).

And it is not only British governments and their representatives who have expressed the notion of Northern Ireland not really being part of the UK, but also the British public. According to Gallagher,

the British seem to look on Ulster Protestants as Irish people who through some quirk of history have managed to acquire a right to British passports. Opinion polls in Britain since the mid-1970s have shown a consistent majority in favour of a united Ireland and a withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland; indeed the British hold these views more strongly than do Northern Ireland Catholics, never mind Protestants (Gallagher, 1995:722).

A study made by Brendan O’Leary on opinion polls made in July 1991 in Northern Ireland, Britain and the Republic of Ireland shows that in “Britain first-preference support for an independent Northern Ireland (20 per cent) comes just behind support for a united Ireland (21 per cent), suggesting widespread British enthusiasm to be rid of Northern Ireland, but indifferences as to the means or the consequences” (1992:46). The result from the opinion poll shows that the public in the three jurisdictions are not in tune with each other. Majorities in both Britain and Ireland prefer a united Ireland, an independent Northern Ireland or at least a role for the Republic in Northern Ireland. But the majority in the jurisdiction in question, Northern Ireland, prefers to be connected to the UK. The plurality here even wants full integration into the UK, despite that this is an alternative not even on the agenda.

The Ulster Protestants are unsure of their identity, with some feeling their loyalty to Ulster in the first hand and some to Britain in the first hand. Some scholars, as Jennifer Todd, see these two groups as two different communities (Gallagher, 1995:733). McGarry and O’Leary are instead suggesting that the

‘Britishness’ of Northern Ireland Protestants is a variable rather than a constant A very significant fraction of Ulster Protestants, according to both poll-data and the research of well-respected academics, either do not have a British national identification, or have a variable identification. More exactly Ulster Protestants are divided between those who identify themselves as British (now the preponderant, but perhaps temporary, majority), those who have no precise national identity whether British or Irish, those who combine both, and a large fraction whose sense

of national identity is subject to very volatile changes. This variation is not necessarily evidence of an 'identity crisis', either collective or individual, but it does put in perspective the slogan that 'Ulster is British', as indeed do the attitudes of the Great British (1995:111-2).

A nation is usually seen as being self-defined. To Connor, a nation is "a self-aware ethnic group. While an ethnic group *may* ... be other-defined, the nation *must* be self-defined" (1994:45-6). The ultimate matter is hence not *what is* but *what people believe is* (1994:37). Tamir distinguishes between the terms 'people' and 'nation', in the same way as Connor distinguishes between 'ethnic group' and 'nation'. "[A] nation is a community conscious of its particularistic existence, whereas ... a people is one of those social units whose existence is independent of their members' consciousness" (1993:65). With these criteria it is "questionable whether the 'British nation' can be said to include the Ulster Protestants if the mainland British do not consider them to be part of 'us'" (Gallagher, 1995:722).

These uncertain feelings of national identity and lack of reciprocal loyalty from the British is part of the alienation unionists feel. In Britain, Northern Ireland is often seen as a place engaged in an ancestral rather than contemporary conflict.

'The Irish are at it again' is a common refrain – as if they have some distinctive genetic propensity to war amongst themselves every second generation, if not every second of the day, and always over issues which are dated, or, as it is usually put, 'irrelevant' ... The Northern Irish, in this view, are trapped in a time-warp, their quarrels available to twentieth-century televisual audiences as instructive commentaries on the merits of modernity Whether described as Catholic or nationalist, or Protestant or unionist, the two communities are portrayed as encased in ancestral myths (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995:215).

This view of the Northern Irish and the conflict is reflected in British media, also in quality papers like the Independent and the Economist. Journalists at these papers feel no sympathy for the Orangemen about their behaviour at Drumcree. During the stand-off in 1996, Andrew Marr wrote in the Independent:

Over two decades the Unionists have received a series of propositions about power-sharing, assemblies and compromises that they have been reluctant to hear. Their lack of an alternative political strategy has made them the naysayers, the immovable object, of modern Europe. But this doggedness, this obstinate tenacity has in turn helped drive them away from the spirit of modern Britain, even while they remain politically part of the UK ... Unless Unionism realises that political compromise is something to grasp, not something to fear, it will cut itself off from the modern world and make its eventual defeat inevitable (1996:15).

John Lyttle, in the same paper two days later, writes about his memories of marching on the Twelfth as a boy. He reflects over how 'the old grey men' ran the Orange Order, and for a long time also Northern Ireland, 'as if by divine right', being certain that they were special in English eyes.

The truth only seems to be penetrating now ... that despite bomb, bullet and IRA ambush, the Nationalists have played the media better, that the RUC won't lay down their uniforms and join in the last hurrah, that even if John Major has to rely on Unionist votes in the Commons, the English political system still sees them as anachronisms – simplistic 19th century minds facing 20th century complexities (1996:21).

The Economist was also hard in its judgement on unionism, in both 1996 and 1997, in editorials and articles considering Drumcree. Just as Andrew Marr, the Economist points to how awkward the unionists are in modern Britain.

To make their point, unionist gangs perversely attacked the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 93% of whose members are Protestant. To protest at any restrictions on their right to 'walk the queen's highway', unionists blockaded entire towns. To demonstrate their support for law and order, they burnt Catholic families out of their homes in Belfast (Economist, 1996a:33).

Drumcree shows the 'political bankruptcy of unionism' according to the Economist's leader-writer, who see no chance of unionist leaders being able to compromise with moderate nationalists, when they cannot even propose a compromise about a short stretch of road in Portadown (1996b:15). And a week later, the leader concludes that "Northern Ireland is unlike anywhere else in Britain – or in Ireland for that matter – and always has been. It has more in common with places riven by religious and political conflict, such as Bosnia and Beirut, than it does with Surrey or Strathclyde (1996c:14).

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PARADES SPECTACLE

There is no problem to find symbols loaded with political value in Northern Ireland. One example is colours. Green by tradition symbolize Ireland, a symbol found in the metaphor for Ireland, The Emerald Isle. On St Patrick's Day, Ireland's national day, the Irish and their friends all over the world dress up in green. In Northern Ireland, green symbolizes the nationalist community.

A marker on the significance of the Orange Order and the Protestant tradition stemming back to King William III of Orange is that the colour orange has come to symbolize the unionist community. When nationalists think the unionists are twisting the British government around their little finger they are also repeatedly coming back to the phrase "The Orange card is being played again".

The Irish national flag is taking up this symbolism. The colours of the tricolour are green for the Catholics, orange for the Protestants and white for the peace between them. Sadly enough, the tricolour is not symbolizing the situation north of the border very well, and there it is instead a symbol for nationalism. The unionists are using the Union Jack or the Ulster flag instead.

To mark out their territory in divided towns, nationalists put tricolours on their lampposts and paint the kerbstones of their pavements green, white and orange, and unionists put Union Jacks on their lampposts and paint their kerbstones red, white and blue. Graffiti and murals carry symbols going back to the different traditions and commemorating the communities' respective heroes from past and present. These symbols hold different meanings to the two communities. To the nationalist, it feels good to see the tricolour in the lamppost outside your home, but to the unionist passing by on the street it is an insult. To the unionist, graffiti saying 'Remember 1690' (the Battle of the Boyne) commemorates a glorious past, but to a nationalist it breathes supremacy.

Not only colours and flags are symbolically loaded. It is also highly likely that the reason why Derry was included in Northern Ireland at all, despite its Catholic majority, was the symbolic significance it holds to unionists due to the Siege of Derry. On the other hand, Derry is symbolic to nationalists also, as the place where the civil rights movement was founded. Derry is also the place where the civil rights movement turned into the Troubles during an Apprentice Boys' march and where some of the worst controversies about marches have taken place every summer, not to forget Bloody Sunday.

The symbols mentioned are all easy to see and the meanings are easy to understand. That the Loyal Orders' parades are of symbolic meaning is also obvious. Nevertheless, many people outside Northern Ireland have difficulties understanding why it is so important to march down a certain street for fifteen minutes or why it is so hard to accept people marching down your street for fifteen minutes. It is clear though, that this has become one of the most important issues in Northern Ireland during the peace process.

This is exemplified by the date of the deadline for the peace talks which was set on the Holy Thursday. At Easter, the marching season starts and a march down the Lower Ormeau Road on Easter Monday was banned before the end of the peace talks. The date of the referenda on the agreement has also been set to May 22, well in time before the marching season's climax at Drumcree and the Twelfth in July.

It is now time to look more deeply into the symbolism communicated by these parades, and why they have become such an extremely difficult issue. Edelman stresses that a Problem usually has been problematic for a long time, but is defined into a social Problem for certain reasons. To define something as a problem is a way of constructing the political spectacle as it is a way of setting the political agenda. He also emphasizes that the real difference between what is labelled a crisis and what is labelled a problem is usually very small. Problems are often termed as crises when they seem to be acute.

The parades issue turned out to be a Crisis in 1995, and especially in 1996, but looking back it is obvious that the Loyal Order's parades have caused confrontations not only the last three summers, nor only since the 1960s, but since the end of the 18th century. Both the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition (1996:8-17) and the Pat Finucane Centre (1997a:16-19) are listing occasions during the first hundred years of the Orange Order's existence when there were troubles, and their first date is 1795. It is noteworthy that Portadown appears several times as a troubled spot in the 19th century. For example, when the British government in 1823 put restrictions on popular societies to curb the Orange Order and its parades, the Grand Lodge dissolved itself, but Orangemen in Portadown and some other places continued to parade (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:16).

The Stormont years (1921-1972) also included controversies over parades. The Orangemen marched annually, also through nationalist areas, and in 1935 a Twelfth of July march invading a small Catholic enclave in Belfast resulted in 9 people dead and 2,241 Catholics intimidated out of Protestant areas (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:25). In the 1950s, the Longstone Road area close to Annalong, Co. Down, became the Drumcree of the day. Stormont banned several marches through this nationalist area, but in 1955 the RUC forced the march through despite the locals blocking the road (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:25-26, Coogan, 1996a:70).

Both Coogan and the Pat Finucane Centre mention some more occasions during the 50s and 60s when marches caused troubles before an Apprentice Boys march in Derry in August 1969 sparked off the Troubles. In the 1970s, there were controversies about Orange parades through the nationalist Obins Street in Portadown, and in the 1980s parades passing through the Obins Street and the Tunnel areas were re-routed to Garvaghy Road (Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition, 1996:20-27; Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:20, 1997c:3).

Parades have thus caused conflicts, even when they have not got as much media attention as during the time of the civil rights movement or during the last three summers. Holiday resorts in the Republic of Ireland have for long been invaded by 'Northerners' in July. Whereas August is the big holiday month in Ireland, many nationalists in Northern Ireland prefer to go south around the Twelfth. A restaurant owner in Derry told me in the summer of 1997 that he was in his twenties the first time he saw an Apprentice Boys march on August 12. His parents had always brought their family down to friends in Cork during this time.

This shows that the parades have caused troubles long before they came to be labelled the parades issue and there were standoffs at Drumcree church. Not even the conflict between the Portadown Lodge and the residents at Garvaghy Road began in 1995. The question is then why the issue turned into a social Problem, fitting into a political spectacle constructed according to Edelman's theories.

The last time marches turned into a Problem was during the civil rights movement. This was probably due to the big change of Catholics taking to the streets and the revolting impact of the civil rights movement on the Northern Irish society. For the elite, predominantly unionist at this time, Catholics demanding civil rights were a threat to their position and it was suitable to turn the civil rights movement into a social problem. Sectarianism split the civil rights movement and quickly turned it into a nationalist movement. Instead of deprived people demanding a just society, the result was nationalists demanding an end of the discrimination and their opponents became unionists as such, not only the threatened elite.

With the start of the Troubles, the parades drowned in the big Problem of paramilitary violence. Much of news reporting and other kinds of writing on Northern Ireland have been focused on this. Troublesome parades have been reported on, but more as yet another problem coming back every summer stressing the impossibility of the two communities to live in peace with each other. Not until 1995, with the first standoff at Drumcree, did the parades issue reach the top of the agenda again.

The great change between the summer of 1994 and the summer of 1995 in Northern Ireland was of course the turn the peace process had taken with the paramilitary ceasefires in the autumn of 1994. The ceasefires and the peace talks obviously changed the political situation and it is likely that this is one reason why the parades issue came high up on the agenda again.

Even though it has already been explained that the media have been excluded as an actor in this analysis, it must be noted here that media attention of course played a big role. The parades are colourful events that make good pictures for television, and the conflicts over the parades are easy to report on as there are two clear combatants. When the conflicts end in riots, there are even better pictures for television. The media attention have made it possible to use the parades in the greater political spectacle of the peace process itself.

Thus, increased media attention is part of the construction of the parades spectacle. However, the involved actors have taken part in the construction and we will now see what kind of Problem the parades issue symbolizes to the two communities respectively, and what Leaders and Enemies that have been constructed. The symbols refer to the same events and people, but they have different meanings to orange and green minds. We will also look on how the two involved governments have dealt with the parades issue the last few years and what kind of solutions they have offered. And while doing this, we will also get a greater understanding for why the parades issue was set on top of the agenda.

THE PARADES SPECTACLE SEEN WITH ORANGE EYES

As shown before, Orangeism and unionism have been closely connected with each other since the end of the last century. It is then likely that the rise of the parades issue to the top of the political agenda in some way is linked to unionist politics.

During the Stormont years (1921-1972), there was one unionist party ruling Northern Ireland on their own for over 50 years. With direct rule, unionism became fragmented and the party split into several sections. Today most of the unionist votes are divided between the UUP and the DUP, and smaller amounts of votes go to the UK Unionist Party and the loyalist parties, the PUP and the UDP. There are also two cross-community parties, the Alliance Party and the Women's Coalition taking a small amount of unionist votes.

The PUP and the UDP emerged with the loyalist paramilitaries ceasefire in October 1994, and even if they still are very small, they have a potential of being successful. Tradi-

tional unionism has not addressed the problems found in deprived working-class areas, and the Opsahl Commission (an inquiry examining attitudes in Northern Ireland) was told in 1992:

The Catholic political future is vibrant, active, with a dynamic civil society – they have for example a profusion of community groups. The Protestant community, by comparison, is apolitical. Outside the public life of the churches, civil society barely exists (quoted in Coogan, 1996a:429).

Sinn Féin has since the first IRA ceasefire in 1994 been very successful, and part of this success is most likely due to the community work the party has done during the years. Many nationalists may have been reluctant to vote for Sinn Féin as long as the IRA supported armed struggle, but when the republican movement showed it was set for political means Sinn Féin votes soared.

The PUP and the UDP could very well fill in the deficit within unionism, and be the most natural choice for the unionist working class. These two parties are distancing themselves from the vigilante tradition within unionism. Whereas traditional unionism has focused on maintaining the old order and opposing any change, the loyalist parties have showed a greater will to compromise and to work for a society where all groups will get recognition. Both these parties are campaigning for a yes vote to the Good Friday Agreement, whereas the DUP and the UK Unionist Party campaign for a no vote and the UUP has a significant number of members who are against the agreement.

There are also strains within the parties, especially within the UUP. One example from the peace process is the question of Sinn Féin being included in the peace talks. As long as John Major's conservative government was dependent on the unionist votes in Westminster, the unionists could hold on to their demand of an IRA decommissioning before Sinn Féin would be allowed into the talks. The labour government is not as ready to bow to unionist demands and it made clear that a new IRA ceasefire was enough for Sinn Féin to be allowed to participate. When the IRA declared a new ceasefire and the labour government stated that Sinn Féin was welcomed into the peace talks, the DUP and the UK Unionist Party walked out of the talks. The UUP decided not to walk out of the talks, but they refused to talk directly with Sinn Féin, maybe a compromise to the different opinions within the party, as unionist voters seem to be more set for compromise than their leaders.

A few days before the talks were about to start in autumn 1997, the Irish Times published results from a survey showing just over 50 per cent of the unionist voters wanted their leaders to take part in face-to-face-talks with Sinn Féin (Breen, 1997). Mary Holland, one of the Irish Times' columnists, writes the same day how the "consultations party leaders conducted in recent weeks with UUP supporters have yielded a sharp geographical divide between the east and west of Northern Ireland. This echoes the differences within the Orange Order earlier this summer over what should be done about controversial marches" (Holland, 1997). A unionist friend told Holland:

On the whole, people living west of the Bann [a river in Northern Ireland between Co. Antrim and Co. Derry] are much keener to see the party go into full talks and argue for the unionist case. Partly, it's because they've been at the sharp end of IRA violence and desperately want to prevent a return to violence. But also they have sat with Sinn Féin in council chambers and don't see that as a major betrayal. It's people in Larne [a town in Co. Antrim] and Portadown who can't and won't stomach the idea (Holland, 1997).

Just as Holland points out, this geographical division within unionism is also found within the Loyal Orders. The Pat Finucane Centre's report on Apprentice Boys Day in Derry in 1995 shows that there seems to be a will for accommodation between Apprentice Boys based in Derry and the Bogside residents. The abusive marchers were in 1995

largely bands from other parts of Northern Ireland, like Portadown. The hard-lined group the Spirit of Drumcree is also based in Portadown.

Obviously, unionism – and Orangeism – is divided and fragmented. There are different opinions within traditional unionism on accepting the peace agreement and accepting Sinn Féin as a political party. The loyalist parties with a more comprising attitude could win support from unionist voters desperate for peace, whereas the UUP runs a risk of splitting.

On top of this unstableness within unionism, there is also the feelings of alienation and the threat of the growing Catholic population. There is a need then for unionist leaders to keep the unionist community together, and to compensate unionists' feelings of loss of their privileged position.

CONSTRUCTING A PROBLEM

The parades issue has been created as a Problem to symbolize the threats towards unionist culture. Following Irish news during the summer 1997, the most common answer I heard from unionists to why the Drumcree march had to be let through was “We have already given so much”. With this they imply that they have been forced to give so much to the nationalists that there is little left of unionist culture. If they would lose the right to march wherever they want, their culture will be lost completely. On the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland's website it is also stated that since “1985 the Loyal Orders have re-routed ten parades from Obins Street/Garvaghy Road area. The Drumcree parade is the only one left that passes along Garvaghy Road” (1997c:1).

However, the unionists' feeling that they have ‘given so much’ can be related back to Elder and Cobb's reasoning about how a dramatic symbolic gesture reassures the general public that a problem is solved. There have been reforms in Northern Ireland, and to many unionists these reforms have been the great dramatic gestures that should have satisfied the nationalist community. The reforms have not satisfied the nationalist community though, as they have not meant an end to discrimination.

It can also be discussed whether the unionists really have ‘given so much’ as the initiatives for the reforms have come from London and because of direct rule the reforms have been forced upon the unionists who in most cases have opposed them. The Sunningdale Agreement is a good example of this. But as Northern Ireland is such a deeply divided society, one community immediately feels that it has lost something if the other community gets something. What is important here is not whether the unionists really *have* ‘given so much’, but if they *feel* that. Many unionists are certain that their community has suffered most from the Troubles. In an interview published in the Irish Times after Billy Wright had been killed, Wright repeatedly states how the loyalist community have suffered from the IRA's violence and that “[l]oyalists today can rhyme off injustices as long as your arm” (quoted in Sharrock, 1998).

Part of the intransigence when it comes to marches is also connected with the ‘No Surrender’ ideals in unionist culture. This makes it impossible to give in when nationalist residents object to an Orange march through their area. To accept a re-routing or banning of a parade is a symbolic surrender. The ‘No Surrender’ ideals probably explains a great deal of unionism's opposition towards change.

Moreover, in Orangeism, “the crucial right of the citizen was the right of free expression throughout his state's territory ... Thus Orange parades assumed the function of marking out Protestant territory” (Miller, quoted in Arthur, 1996:434). According to Arthur, this is the reason for the great number of parades. Most of the parades are held in Protestant territory, but the changes of demography are challenging. In areas where Protestants are on the decline, like Derry, the Garvaghy Road and the Lower Ormeau Road,

it may be even more important to march for the sake of marking out territory. For unionists feeling subjected to ethnic cleansing, a march down a road is a symbolic way of showing that even if we have been driven out of this area, the area is still ours.

In defence of the Drumcree parade, the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland is emphasizing the strict code of conduct during the parade: that “as an act of good faith bands do not play at all along the Garvaghy Road”, that there are only two bannerettes carried in the parade and that the marchers are all local members from the Portadown District. They also count the number of houses in the estates in question, 900, and stress that only 66 of these houses face directly onto the Garvaghy and Drumcree Roads and less than 10 houses have addresses on the Garvaghy Road. The fact that such few houses directly face Garvaghy Road was the reason for the RUC to re-route parades to this stretch of road in 1985 (1997c:1).

However, it does not matter neither to the residents nor to the Portadown Lodge that there are less than ten houses are located on the Garvaghy Road as the whole issue is about symbolism. The area is seen as a nationalist area, and after the Orangemen have paraded down Garvaghy Road the three last summers they have celebrated the event as a victory. The number of marchers or bands is not the core of the matter. As long as Orange feet are marching down the street, it is an Orange victory and the Garvaghy Road is still Protestant territory. Here we see that the symbolism that is easy to apprehend, i.e. the bands, banners, collarettes etc, is not the most deeply loaded. The less explicit symbol, but probably the most important, is instead the access to the road.

To unionists, the Problem they have constructed of the parades issue is that their civil rights are violated if they are not allowed to march wherever they want to. The right to assembly is usually restricted in democracies, but to unionists in Northern Ireland their right to march on any road is total. That nationalist residents are only objecting to a handful of the thousands of marches held every year by the Loyal Orders does not matter either. One march banned is one too much, if your ideal is No Surrender.

An interesting fact is that it seems as only unionist civil rights are important. The civil rights of the marching Orangemen are always of higher value than of the objecting residents, who in many cases have been sealed off in their homes for hours, or as in the case of Drumcree III had no possibility to get to their own church for mass. This shows that it is not civil rights as such that is the core of the Problem. The core is the denial of unionists' right to mark out their territory and the denial of them having a total access to the roads in Northern Ireland.

It is interesting to consider the fact that whereas unionists on several instances have been able to put Northern Ireland to a total stand-still while blocking roads, shutting off air-ports, harbours and bus and railway lines, nationalists have never been able to do anything of the like. Nationalists have been able to set up no-go areas, but only in nationalist areas. When nationalists are rioting, they are usually rioting in their own parts of their cities, destroying nationalist property. When unionists break out into serious riots, they are able to bring all of Northern Ireland to a stand-still, as during Drumcree II, during the protests against the Anglo-Irish Agreement and during the UWC's general strike bringing down the Sunningdale Agreement.

CONSTRUCTING LEADERS

One of the central persons in the parades issue and the peace process is the UUP party leader David Trimble. The last few years he has showed different sides of his personality, being extremely hard-lined when it comes to Drumcree but saying yes to the peace agreement. It is not easy to get a grip on Trimble's character, something that is of-

ten mentioned by political commentators (e.g. Marr, 1998), but his character is most likely the character of a true political Leader of Edelman's model.

It is quite clear that David Trimble used Drumcree I to get the leadership of the UUP. The former leader, James Molyneaux, had announced that he would resign, and David Trimble, a Portadown Orangeman, wanted to take his place. When the march finally was let through Garvagh Road, Trimble constructed his leadership while dancing around with Ian Paisley after the march, triumphantly claiming that there had been no compromise but they had won a victory (Arthur, 1996:435).

This resulted in the Garvagh Road residents feeling they had been steamrolled, but Trimble got his leadership of the UUP. Paisley very likely strengthened his already strong position in the DUP. The Grand Master of the Orange Order, Martin Smyth, instead lost his leadership in 1996, seen as a traitor who gave in when the RUC stopped the march at Drumcree church.

The Drumcree disorders did probably also help to construct Billy Wright's leadership. Billy Wright was already the leader of the Mid-Ulster UVF who, although the UVF was on ceasefire, conducted murders during Drumcree II. Wright split with the UVF and set up his own force, the LVF, and was seen by many in Portadown as some sort of folk hero. His symbolic position as a leader for the loyalists who did not believe in the ceasefire was also clearly the reason for the INLA to assassinate him.

Considering Trimble's hard-lined attitude to Drumcree – he has for example refused so far to talk with the Garvagh Road residents, his own constituents – it is surprising that he became the unionist leader who did not say no but yes to fundamental changes of the Northern Irish society, i.e. the Good Friday Agreement. On the other hand, if we follow Edelman's model for a political Leader this is not so surprising. As Edelman says, it is not specificity but ambiguity that add to a leaders appeal, and it is the appeal, not the ideology, that makes the leader useful. "Political leaders are most useful when they can represent whatever meaning concerned groups want to see in them" (1988:63).

Trimble fits in well here, both representing the hard-lined Orange attitude that seems to have its centre around Portadown, and the strands of unionism that are looking for a working peace settlement. He plays a risky game though. He has used Drumcree as a means to win and strengthen his leadership, at the same time as he has shown great courage and political maturity while remaining in the peace talks and accepting an agreement. Accepting the Good Friday Agreement has put great strains on his leadership as there is an important minority of UUP members who are utterly opposed to it.

Trimble is the most likely to become First Minister of the new power-sharing assembly, and how he will combine that position with his membership of the Portadown Orange Lodge will be interesting to see. Trimble has skilfully balanced between hard-lined Orangeism and compromising unionism, but it is hard to see that he will be able to continue in the same way in the future.

CONSTRUCTING ENEMIES

The most clear Enemy that the Orangemen have constructed during the last three years of controversies over parades is Breandán Mac Cionnaith, an independent local councillor and spokesperson of the Garvagh Road Residents' Coalition. The Portadown Lodge maintains that Mac Cionnaith is a member of Sinn Féin and the lodge refuses all negotiations in the same way as the unionist parties have refused to let Sinn Féin take part in the peace talks.

The Garvagh Road Residents' Coalition gives an example of how they, during the standoff in 1996, apprehended that Mac Cionnaith was made an Enemy. "The Rev. Martin Smyth, MP and Grand Master of the Orange Order, commenced a campaign aimed at

demonising the main spokesperson for the Garvaghy Residents [i.e. Mac Cionnaith]. As a result of these personal attacks and before the week was over, the residents' spokesperson was to become the focus of intense loyalist hatred and the recipient of several paramilitary death threats" (1996:41).

The UUP in their submission to the North Report discusses the difficulties with the consent principle, i.e. that the residents in an area should give their consent to a contentious march. "Certainly the danger exists that so called residents groups are open to infiltration by extremists whose objective is to foment sectarian confrontation. Such individuals invariably seek to dominate these groups and in some instances there is clear evidence of intimidation at work" (1997:2). However, some unionist leaders' readiness to associate themselves with Billy Wright shows that it is not extremists as such that are the Enemy. Loyalist extremism and intimidation is obviously easier to swallow, as an extreme loyalist like Billy Wright has not been constructed as an Enemy, but as a Leader.

The refusal of negotiating with Sinn Féin is a risky business, as for unionists from the western parts of Northern Ireland it is not such a big deal. For unionists in Antrim and Down it is much more controversial. In Portadown, a unionist stronghold, refusing to talk to Sinn Féin members goes down very well among the unionist community, and the Enemy is in this case more of a help than a threat. As long as Mac Cionnaith is speaking for the Garvaghy Road's residents, the Orange lodge has a reason not to negotiate with them about the march. And as long as they are not negotiating, there is no risk of reaching any sort of accommodation that would change the status quo.

The parades issue has actually not created a new Enemy for the unionists, but strengthened the old one, i.e. Sinn Féin. Not only the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition is said to be led by a Sinn Féin member, but all residents' groups are said to be infiltrated by Sinn Féin. This is denied both by the residents' groups and Sinn Féin, but as Sinn Féin is usually very strong in the areas where controversies of parades are greatest and some of the leaders of the residents' groups are former republican prisoners, it is easy to make the connection.

ORANGE SOLUTIONS

As unionists see their civil rights at stake in the parades spectacle, their solution of the issue is to protect these rights. This means that the freedom of assembly should be total for unionists, and they should have the right to march down any road in Northern Ireland, regardless if this is expected to lead to conflict or not. To avoid conflict, the security forces should protect the marchers. It is not the marches that cause problems in the eyes of loyal unionists, but the opposing nationalist residents.

This attitude is dangerous for two reasons. First, it is not certain that the security forces will be able to protect the Loyal Orders while they are marching. It has been shown repeatedly that the security forces are not able to protect the state's citizens against paramilitary violence and intimidating mobs. The British state is not even able to protect its citizens within its highest security prison, as the INLA could smuggle in a gun and kill Billy Wright in the Maze. This is obviously something the Orders realized last summer when they cancelled and rerouted the most controversial parades on the Twelfth due to paramilitary threats.

Second, it is a solution to the spectacle that nationalists are not going to accept. For many years, they did accept Orange feet marching wherever they wanted to as they did not seem to have any other choice, but that time is gone. There is now a risk that the Orange victories at Drumcree will turn out as pyrrhic victories.

So far, nationalist residents are only objecting towards a very small number of marches. If the Orders continue to refuse rerouting of these marches nationalists may

start to oppose Orange marches as such. Even though the Orange Order always claims it is a world-wide organization, the world does not understand their marching tradition. In Britain and the Republic of Ireland there is little support for the marches, and it must be remembered that the marches are forced through at an enormous economic cost.

The British tax-payers, who are already paying very much to keep Northern Ireland within the union, may lose interest in supporting the Orangemen's total right to march on any road. In Northern Ireland, reactions to the costs of the marches have already occurred. When the Closing of the Gate ceremony in December 1997 caused serious riots in Derry, Derry's businessmen were furious. This weekend was expected to have been the busiest one before Christmas. Every August at peak time of the tourist season, all businesses in Derry close down for a weekend when the Apprentice Boys are marching. Derry has great potential of becoming a tourist spot and being so close to the border, it is easy for people in Derry to see how much money they could be making out of tourism if their summers would not be ridden by riots.

The Loyal Orders claim that rerouting marches is a threat to their culture, but insisting on the contentious marches may in the long run be an even bigger threat. If the parades issue is not solved, the parades might be banned altogether. The British government has already outlawed the Orange Order once before when too much trouble was caused by its marches in the 19th century.

THE PARADES SPECTACLE SEEN WITH GREEN EYES

Even though the nationalists are on the fore in Northern Ireland, a recurring phrase from them is that 'Nothing has changed', i.e. nothing has changed since the time of the civil rights movement. Orange marches are always let through in the end, even after a standoff lasting several days and nearly leading Northern Ireland to the brink. Nationalist riots are always more harshly put down than loyalist riots.

But just as with the unionist phrase 'We have already given so much', it is not true that nothing has changed. Very much has changed indeed, and the most important change is probably that the nationalists have gained a self-confidence. They will never again accept the kind of one-party state the first fifty years of unionist rule in Northern Ireland brought. But nationalists are looking for more improvements. As Edelman points out, the optimistic kind of mass movements usually occurs after initial reforms have shown that improvements are something to expect. Nationalists today know that they do not have to accept discrimination.

CONSTRUCTING A PROBLEM

To nationalists, the parades issue has always confirmed their status as second-class citizen. When Drumcree I brought the parades issue to the top of the agenda, the nationalists simply used the issue as yet another evidence of that "Nothing has changed". It is a useful Problem for the nationalists, as the international opinion does not understand the cause of the Orangemen, and are likely to feel sympathy with the residents instead. International observers have also several times reported on how the security forces have been unnecessarily brutal towards protesting residents.

The RUC Chief Constable in 1997 confirmed nationalists' feeling of being second-class citizens when he stated that the decision to let the Drumcree march through was the 'least worse' of the two bad options. According to the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition, "Government officials preferred to see 'Orange feet on Garvaghy Road' irrespective of the protection of whatever rights the people of Garvaghy were entitled to"

(1996:50). The Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition also states what they see as the heart of the matter:

It is not the marches, it is not the banners or the bands, it is not the numbers taking part that is the problem – the problem is the Orange Order itself as an overtly sectarian and political organisation that places itself above the law It is the link between the Orange Order, Unionism and the RUC, and their synchronised operation in forcing parades on through areas where they are unwelcome, which strengthen in Catholic/Nationalist eyes the perceptions of Orange parades as instruments of, and vehicles for, Protestant/Unionist domination; and which add to their own feelings of inequality and alienation (1996:51-3).

The Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition is here making it clear, once again, that it is not the overt symbols that are causing the problems – it is the Orange Order itself, and its ability to get access to a road going through a predominantly nationalist area.

CONSTRUCTING LEADERS

What is significant with the green side of the parades spectacle is the absence of constructed Leaders. However, there is not the same need for nationalists to use the parades issue to create Leaders as for the unionists. Nationalists are not as fragmented, being divided mainly between two parties instead of five. These two parties have very prominent leaders in John Hume and Gerry Adams, two of the most important persons behind the peace process. They hardly need the parades issue to strengthen their positions.

The leaders of the residents' groups are quite anonymous. The only one standing out is Breandán Mac Cionnaith from the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition, who does not seem to have any ambitions of becoming more than a local leader. His local leadership is, however, most likely created from the parades issue. Obviously, he also plays that role well as the Orangemen's claim that he is a terrorist does not seem to have influenced the Garvaghy Road residents to choose another spokesperson.

The residents' groups stress that they are not dominated by individuals but are collectives of the residents. The Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition was set up as "an umbrella group of tenants associations in the various housing estates, political parties and Drumcree and Justice Group", and it changed its original name the Garvaghy Road Residents' Group to the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition as "it included representatives of several groups based within the town's Catholic/Nationalist community; and also to reflect the widespread and varied support it enjoyed" (Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition, 1996:29,35).

There is no over-arching organization for the residents' groups, and they stress their smallness compared to the size of their antagonists. The Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition asks: "How can a small community, that has to shoulder more than its fair share of deprivation, stand up to the combined forces of the Orange Order, the unionist parties and loyalist extremists?" (1996:50). They also emphasize how they are trying to reach accommodation with the Orangemen. Breandán Mac Cionnaith did for example in the weeks before Drumcree III repeatedly state that the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition did not oppose the marches as such, and that they did not want the Drumcree march banned for ever, but wanted a 'breathing space for this year'. The Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition also asked their supporters not to come to Portadown for Drumcree III as this would only make the situation worse.

In this way, Mac Cionnaith and the residents' groups reinforces the picture of the Orangemen, the unionists, as relentless big bullies and the nationalists as the ones being ready to negotiate for a peaceful and just society. In fact, the nationalist residents are just as intransigent as the Orangemen when it comes to the parades, but they successfully cover their intransigence with talk of accommodation.

CONSTRUCTING ENEMIES

The Enemies used in the parades spectacle are for nationalists, just in the case of unionists, mostly traditional ones. The Orange Order is a classic Enemy, and the same goes for the RUC. The Orange Order is the very essence of the unionist supremacy culture, and the RUC, consisting to around 90 per cent of Protestants, are not seen by nationalists as a police force for them. A new Enemy created after Drumcree III was the Northern Secretary of State, Dr Mo Mowlam.

Mowlam came to Northern Ireland after the general election in 1997 symbolizing change for both communities. However, she promised too much, and broke the promise to the Garvaghy Road residents that she would tell them personally of her decision about the march. A few days after the march, the document was leaked from the NIO showing that the decision had been taken over two weeks before the march. The woman who as a Northern Secretary nearly was a Leader also for nationalists, became an Enemy, and a part of 'Nothing has changed'. The British are never to be trusted.

As is usual with leaks, this leak from the NIO was hardly a coincidence, but probably a well-timed attempt to force Mo Mowlam to resign. It did not succeed, however, and Mowlam has shown great skills in the peace talks. However, to the nationalists feeling betrayed by her she is less of a victim, and nationalist graffiti in for example Belfast and Derry reminds of her betrayal.

GREEN SOLUTIONS

To nationalists, the problem with the marches is the violation of their civil rights, the right to be spared from anti-Catholic organizations marching down predominantly Catholic streets, celebrating Protestant victories over Catholics. So far, no residents groups have, however, demanded a ban on Loyal marches as such. The idea is instead that the Orange culture and traditions should be respected, as long as it is not inflicting on the rights of the other community. The solution of the problem is to negotiate with the orders in order to reach accommodation.

The problem with this attitude is of course that not all lodges are interested in negotiations, and as long as the British government is giving in to them, they will continue to assert their right to march down the road in question. To nationalists, the British government then has a great responsibility in making sure that both communities get equal recognition when there is a conflict over a march.

The parades spectacle has emphasized the importance for nationalists to secure their position within a future Northern Ireland. During the autumn of 1997, the journalist Tom McGurk discussed the future of Northern Ireland in a series of articles in the Sunday Business Post. He stressed how important it is not only to look at political solutions, but on the society as a whole.

In fact, if the six counties is to retain its current constitutional position within the UK, the consent required from nationalist Ireland for that, will demand that almost everything about the state, except the line on the map, will have to change. And that will involve the whole ambit of the current symbolic, cultural and traditional nature of the northern state (1997a).

A new Northern Irish state must win the legitimacy in nationalists' eyes that Northern Ireland never has had, and this can only be achieved "in new conditions where proportional political power will be reflected in a new and official, cultural and symbolic symbolism of 'Irishness'" (McGurk, 1997b).

McGurk emphasizes an important point here, a point that the parades issue has brought to the fore. A power-sharing assembly and a few cross-border institutions will not be enough for nationalists to accept a continued partition of Ireland, as long as the unionist culture always gets priority. Most nationalists who support the Good Friday Agreement also point out that this is something to start building a settlement on, not the final solution for peace. The parades issue has shown that a settlement must imply a fundamental change of the Northern Irish society.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

To Britain, Ireland has been the eternal 'Irish problem'. To the Irish, it has of course been more of a British problem, but according to Coogan, British policies towards Ireland have concentrated on becoming involved as little as possible. "Partition was viewed as a device for getting Ireland off Britain's agenda. Ireland, north or south, was a notoriously thorny issue, a graveyard of political reputations. Getting involved in the internal affairs of the six-county state [i.e. Northern Ireland] meant facing the high risk of fetching up in that graveyard" (1996a:38). Johnston also notes how the devolved system of the Stormont parliament "represented a way of distancing Westminster from Irish problems, a recognition that for all their protestations, unionists with their idiosyncratic conceptions of loyalty, and archaic political culture were not truly part of metropolitan British politics" (1990:10).

Today, Northern Ireland is an expensive remainder of the colonies. The end of the Cold War has lessened the territory's strategic worth. The subvention from Britain is "rising steadily towards £(UK)3.5 billion; and it accounted for 23 per cent of Northern Ireland's GDP in 1992" (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995:227). The unemployment rate has been very high for decades, and industry and tourism have suffered during the Troubles.

Apart from the material problems, the UK has lost international credibility because of violating human rights in Northern Ireland, censoring the broadcasting media, torturing prisoners, bribing informers, keeping innocent people in jail for up to 16-17 years (the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven), killing innocent people with plastic bullets etc. Peace would lessen the cost and the troubles that comes with Northern Ireland. It is no wonder that the two last British governments have worked hard for the peace process.

The symbolic value of the parades issue to the British government is that there is indeed an eternal 'Irish problem'. The social Problem of the parades issue is part of the 'Irish problem', a constructed Problem in itself. Whatever the British try to do, the Irish mess things up. When the British and Irish governments together are trying to get the parts together for talks, the actors involved go out to fight seriously about a march down a road.

When the conservatives had the majority in Westminster, the British government had reasons to bow to the unionists. They needed their votes to ensure their small majority. However, the labour government showed with Drumcree III that they are just as likely to bow to the threat of violence and let the Orangemen win another victory. It has been argued that Mo Mowlam was steamrolled by officials in the NIO for the decision taken of not banning the march, and whether that is true or not, it is interesting to look at the way the NIO sees the parades issue.

THE NIO

Reading the leaked document from the NIO about the Drumcree march in 1997 makes you wonder if the NIO really understand the symbolic values of this parade. The

independent mediators that brokered the compromise in 1995 were told by the RUC that there would be no future marches on Garvaghy Road without the consent of the residents. In 1996, the march was nevertheless forced through with no compromise broken. In the document, published in the Irish Times, it is clearly said that in 1997

the consensus among the key players – the Secretary of State, the Minister of State, the Chief Constable, the GOC, Parades Commission Chairman, – is that, if there is no local accommodation, a controlled parade on the Garvaghy Road is the least worst outcome. An underlying objective of the talks will therefore be to: Identify the maximum concessions which the Orange Order are willing to make to strip out from the parade resonances which nationalists might find offensive: To broker offsetting measures which might help to reconcile the Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition to this outcome: And to gain an undertaking from the residents that any protest they mount will be peaceful and restrained (Irish Times, 1997).

After two years of serious disorder surrounding this march, it should be quite clear to most people that as long as Orange feet are marching down Garvaghy Road, the Orangemen are the winners and the residents the losers. Several examples are listed in the document on how the parade could be “adjusted to make it more acceptable to residents”, consisting of only local Orangemen, no bands, parade well-disciplined etc, i.e. the kind of measures that were taken already in 1995 and 1996 with no success of making the march acceptable to the residents.

Some counter-balancing measures to help “reconcile the residents (or, failing them, the wider nationalist opinion) to the parade” is also suggested. One example says that “if the root cause of the residents’ opposition to the parade is retaliation from the fact that they feel excluded from Portadown town centre, then support for a nationalist parade/festival at an appropriately symbolic location in Portadown might be an effective counterweight” (Irish Times, 1997).

It is quite amazing that the officials from the British government and the NIO do not understand the nationalist residents better than this. It is hardly only exclusion from Portadown town centre that is the ‘root cause’ of opposition. Nationalists have felt excluded for centuries, from far more than Portadown town centre. To state that a parade down the Garvaghy Road is ‘the least worst outcome’, is just to confirm the nationalists’ feelings of being seen as second-class citizens.

The Orange construction of an Enemy in Breandán Mac Cionnaith seems to have been swallowed by these ‘key players’. Deaglán de Bréadún, Northern Editor of the Irish Times, comments upon the view on Mac Cionnaith expressed in the document:

There is a note of antipathy towards ‘McKenna’, viz Breandán Mac Cionnaith, spokesman for the Garvaghy residents, who seems to be viewed as a clever but unmanageable native chieftain who will ‘scupper’ invitations if he gets them too early and who might ‘seek to confront the Orangemen in person’... However, it might be possible to get ‘McKenna’ into direct negotiations with the Orangemen at some stage if he would only walk under the spear and ‘acknowledge his terrorist past and disclaim any present influence by Sinn Féin’ (de Bréadún, 1997).

These ‘key players’ also seem to be certain of Sinn Féin’s involvement in the residents’ groups, as a prime objective is to persuade “McKenna (and Sinn Féin) that it is time to play for the draw” (Irish Times, 1997).

This document gives a naïve impression of the ‘key players’ who, besides from not understanding the symbolism of the parades issue, are not putting the issue in its wider context. For example, the paramilitary threat is not mentioned at all, despite that Billy Wright and his brigade of the UVF were involved in the two previous standoffs. In 1997, his splinter group the LVF issued very clear threats towards citizens in the Republic of

Ireland if the march was to be banned. The paramilitary threats were also said to be a main cause when the decision of letting the march through was made public.

The NIO's website express a similar kind of naivety saying that a "successful resolution to the problems associated with contentious parades... lies in the hands of the most directly involved, on both sides of the community, who must demonstrate a genuine will and commitment to overcome their differences" (NIO, 1997:8). Does the NIO remember that they are in a deeply divided society, where people from the two communities are bitter enemies? And how do you demonstrate genuine will and commitment when one side (the Portadown Orange Lodge) year after year refuses to negotiate?

The Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition also quotes BBC TV where Sir Patrick Mayhew, Northern Secretary during Drumcree I, said: "Its not for me, I have no role in this at all. I'm certainly not going to act as an adjudicator or arbitrator or anything of that sort; that's quite unconstitutional" (1996:31). If the Northern Secretary has no role in a very serious crisis affecting the whole of Northern Ireland, the question is what role the Northern Secretary has at all. Besides, Mo Mowlam obviously interprets her role quite differently as she in 1997 saw Drumcree as one of her most important issues.

Neither the British government nor the NIO seem to understand the threats felt from both sides, and the symbolic reassurance they should give. The Irish use to complain about the British never understanding them and one is bound to agree when reading these kind of documents. The NIO officials do not even seem to understand the politeness of spelling peoples' names correctly as they have translated Breandán Mac Cionnaith's name into English.

THE RUC

The RUC has over and over been accused of being partial, and nationalists in Northern Ireland often see this nearly all Protestant police force as their enemy. When the Pat Finucane Centre made a report about the events in Derry following Drumcree II, the centre found that "witnesses were not prepared to give their statements to the RUC" (1997c:5). This included statements from eye-witnesses to the death of a man who was crushed under a British army vehicle.

The Drumcree disorders have also shown a partial behaviour from the RUC. It is very obvious that the RUC hit back much harder against the nationalists riots in 1996 than against the loyalist riots during the standoff. The Pat Finucane Centre is highly critical towards the RUC and claims that the police force "actually initiated the series of events which led to three nights of rioting in Derry and which caused some serious damage to the city centre" (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997c:5).

Whether the RUC are guilty or not for initiating the riots, it is enough to look at the number of plastic bullets fired during the disorder to see the partial behaviour of the RUC. Plastic bullets are used by the security forces during riots and have killed 17 people in Northern Ireland so far, and maimed hundreds. From Sunday July 7 to Thursday July 11, 662 plastic bullets were fired. This was during the standoff at Drumcree, when loyalist riots brought the whole of Northern Ireland to a stand-still. When the march had been forced through on July 11, riots spread among nationalists, but the disturbances were restricted to nationalist working-class areas. From July 11 until Sunday 14, the RUC fired 5,340 plastic bullets. This is stated in the Pat Finucane Centre's report and the centre has got the figures from the RUC. Similar figures have been published in various newspapers articles as well.

During the Drumcree standoffs, the RUC has ended up in a situation where the people who are usually loyal to them, suddenly have seen them as their Enemies. It is not the first time loyalists are reacting in this way, and their tendency of attacking the Crown's

forces as an act of loyalty is noted by many scholars. Johnston says: "Their ideas on loyalty and obedience are contractual, and highly conditional, and ... they reserve the right to determine in every detail and on every appropriate occasion the limits of others' authority over them" (1990:11).

At Drumcree, hostile Orangemen have threatened police officers, which has most likely been very scary threats. The Orangemen are from the same community, and many of them would be neighbours, relatives, friends to the RUC officers and know where they and their families live. The relations between RUC officers and Orangemen also make it hard for the RUC to put disorder down with the same tough measures they use against nationalists. It is only human to hesitate if the people causing the disorder might include your father, brother, best friend or neighbour.

Besides, no one seems to know how many RUC officers are members of the Loyal Orders. The Pat Finucane Centre tried to get information from the Police Authority on this, but got the reply that the RUC does not require officers to declare membership of the Orders (Pat Finucane Centre, 1997a:24). The Orders do not know either how widespread membership is within the RUC. According to the Pat Finucane Centre, 13 per cent of the killed RUC members were also members of the Orange Order. The Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition says that it "is believed that 25% of RUC personnel are in the Loyal Orders" (1996:7).

The connections between the Orders and the RUC naturally put the RUC in a tricky position. However, the force exists to maintain law and order, and it is in no way excusable that the security forces could not strike back towards the loyalist rioters during the standoff in 1996. About 11,000 RUC men and 18,500 British soldiers should after 25 years of Troubles be able to handle a situation like this, and they should have prepared for it as the disorder was hardly unexpected. The security forces has during the three summers of disorders not only failed to maintain order and protect the state's citizens, but also failed to give the necessary symbolic reassurance that they are protecting both communities in Northern Ireland.

However, the parades issue could also be used by the RUC, just as several other groups are using this problem for their purposes. The Pat Finucane Centre, that keeps a hard line towards the RUC all through their reports, states in their report from the riots during Apprentice Boys Day in Derry in 1995, that throughout "this summer every single manufactured confrontation has been used by the RUC to justify its own cumbersome and expensive pre-ceasefire existence" (1997b:11).

The peace process is severely threatening the RUC. It has been said that with peace in Northern Ireland, the RUC could be diminished to a third of its present numbers. One of the recurring demands during the peace talks is also reforms of the RUC, to make it a police force for both communities. If the RUC is both diminished and reformed so that the percentage of Catholics would be equivalent to the percentage among the population, many RUC officers run the risk of losing a well-paid job. A peace settlement is a threat to many individual RUC officers, and they need to be reassured of their future.

SOLUTIONS FROM LONDON

To the conservative government, the solution of the parades issue seemed to be to become involved as little as possible. Decisions were handed over to the Chief Constable, and nothing was done to prevent Drumcree II. Even though it must have been clear to everyone after Drumcree I that the next year would see the same problems, it was not until the march was on its way that it was stopped (and later let through).

The seriousness of the disorder in 1996 forced through some action from the British government and an independent review, the North Report, was set up. This thorough

done inquiry was presented at the beginning of 1997, but none of the measures it suggested were taken until the labour government took over.

The labour government at least showed intentions of wanting to solve the issue, but, as the leaked NIO document shows, the measures were more or less the same as had been tried before. For this year, the parades commission is supposed to be the authority making the decisions about the marches, but it has already run into problems. It was meant to publish its decisions about the summer's marches in the end of April but was told by London to wait until after the referenda on May 22. This made people question the independence of the commission. At the same time, one member of the commission decided to resign. This shakiness foreshadows problems with Drumcree IV.

THE IRISH GOVERNMENT

To the Irish government, the parades issue is as much an unwelcome Problem as it is to the British government. Many Irish politicians and officials have worked very hard the last decade with the peace process. The peace process seems to result in greater influence for the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland's affairs. In the end, it could mean a united Ireland, as when the nationalist population have become the largest community it might take the opportunity to vote itself out of the union.

To the political elite in Dublin, a united Ireland is not the most wanted solution. If it had been, Irish governments would have worked much harder for an end of partition. The politicians of today live on the situation created by partition, and a united Ireland would mean great challenges to them. With Northern nationalists and unionists among the electorate, the leading parties today would lose a great deal. To many in the elite, the status quo is preferable to a united Ireland.

Outside Dublin and the elite, sentiments are quite different. The fact that Sinn Féin gets very few votes in Republic of Ireland should not be taken as a sign that the Irish south of the border do not entertain feelings for Northern Ireland. The latest presidential election is an example on how the Irish south of the border do recognize the nationalists north of the border as members of their nation. Mary McAleese, who is from Co. Down and has made a career as a law professor at Queen's University in Belfast, won a landslide victory and the smearing campaign her competitors tried, that included insinuations that McAleese was not truly Irish, had no effect on the opinion polls.

Irish politicians are also aware of these sentiments and "the Republic's leaders calculate, correctly, that their citizens are not as revisionist or as materialist as the Dublin intelligentsia" (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995:301). To try and get peace in Northern Ireland and to stand up for nationalists is therefore an aim that suits the Irish electorate.

During the Drumcree crises, Dublin has chosen to support the nationalist residents. Coming up to Drumcree III, Taoiseach Bertie Ahern stated that he did not wish to see the march being let through, thereby upsetting the British who considered this to be their decision. Even John Bruton, who was seen by nationalists as a very unionist Taoiseach, was furious when the march was forced through in 1996.

The Irish government cannot make any decisions when it comes to the parades, but it seems to have understood its role, in comparison to the British government. The Irish government is at least giving the nationalist residents reassurance. Moreover, the present government also seems to use the parades issue for their own purposes. Taoiseach Bertie Ahern kept a clearly nationalist profile through the peace talks and with the peace agreement at hand, he has turned very green and is talking about the agreement leading to a united Ireland. Just as David Trimble, Bertie Ahern seems to understand the symbolic value of the parades issue. If the Northern nationalists will get a vote in the Dáil through

the settlement, Ahern and his party could be remembered as standing behind the nationalists, both during the peace talks and during such events as Drumcree.

SOLUTIONS FROM DUBLIN

The Irish government has so far no concrete means to influence the parades issue. However, when it comes to Drumcree, both John Bruton's and Bertie Ahern's governments have taken the nationalist residents' side even if this has disturbed the relations with London. It is hard to know how the Irish government would act if it would get a say in the parades issue, but most likely it would follow the proposals in the North Report and work for negotiations between residents and marchers. Nevertheless, if the Irish government got a direct influence in the parades issue, it is quite clear that the nationalist residents would get a stronger support.

THE PARADES SPECTACLE AND THE PEACE PROCESS

As should now be clear, the parades issue is to a very great extent connected with the peace process. The way the actors treat the parades spectacle mirror their behaviour in the peace process.

The Loyal Orders refuse to negotiate with the residents' groups because they are, according to the Orders, infiltrated with republican paramilitaries, the Enemy. The residents' groups are considered not to be residents' groups, but subdivisions of Sinn Féin. In this way, the Loyal Orders use the same tactic as unionist politicians when they talk about Sinn Féin/IRA as a single entity. Connections between Sinn Féin and the IRA are undoubtedly very strong, but it is a mistake not to see them as separate organizations. To equal Sinn Féin with the IRA implies that Sinn Féin is no more than a gang of terrorists and can never be a respectable political party, irrespective of its great development during the years of the peace process. As Sinn Féin is seen as equal to the IRA, the residents' groups then do not become much more than gangs of terrorists either.

The paradox here is that loyalist paramilitaries have been very much involved in for example the Drumcree disorders, and that many bands taking part in the parades carry paramilitary flags. The Orders deny having a responsibility for the bands, but if they were really serious about stripping their parades from paramilitary flags they would not hire those bands. We find the same kind of double standard among the Loyal Orders and the unionist politicians when it comes to connections with paramilitaries. In the peace process, very little has been said about excluding the PUP and the UDP from peace talks or participating in power-sharing executives until the UVF and the UDA have decommissioned their weapons. The unionist parties in the peace process have refused to talk to Sinn Féin because of its connection with the IRA but do not hesitate to negotiate with loyalist paramilitaries. Examples of this are the associations between unionist politicians and Billy Wright, and the readiness among unionist politicians (and the British government) to negotiate with loyalist prisoners when the loyalist ceasefire was close to a breakdown in the beginning of 1998.

Going back to Edelman, we can realize that this is simple Enemy construction. "Enemies are characterized by an inherent trait or set of traits that marks them as evil, immoral, warped, or pathological and therefore a continuing threat regardless of what course of action they pursue, regardless of whether they win or lose in any particular encounter, and even if they take no political action at all" (1988:67). It does not matter that the IRA is on ceasefire, that Sinn Féin has conceded that they cannot see a united Ireland in the short future or that the former republican prisoners leading the residents' groups

have left their paramilitary past behind them – they are constructed Enemies, and whether they develop or not they are still symbolizing the same threat.

Whereas republicanism has shown an ability to adjust itself to the changed reality, groups like the Loyal Orders are clinging on to their traditions and the way things always have been. However, traditions that are not adjusting to the changed reality usually do not survive. If the Loyal Orders start to seek accommodation with residents' group and defuse the issue, their parades could turn into appreciated events and become tourist attractions. If they continue to refuse changing their contentious routes, the parades will continue to cause disorder and polarization. The economic cost of the contentious parades has already been pointed out, and in the long run the Loyal Orders may not be able to accept the same kind of support from its own community as it has now.

Maybe we can see the Loyal Orders as a metaphor for unionism. Unionism is in a crisis, which is shown for example by the fragmentation among parties. Changes in Northern Ireland are inevitable, and the loyalist parties and the greater part of the UUP have realized this. Others, like Ian Paisley of the DUP and Robert McCartney of the UK Unionist Party, did not even want to take part in the peace talks. They are saying no to the Good Friday Agreement, but have no alternative solutions to the conflict. For the ordinary unionist voters, tired of living in fear of political violence, this attitude has little to offer, and the question is if unionism will survive as we know it.

The residents' group are just as the Orders intransigent when it comes to the contentious marches, but with a big difference. They are not claiming any total right to decide whether the Orders are welcome on a certain street or not. They also show a greater will to find solutions that both groups will accept for the future. Their intransigence when it comes to Garvaghy Road for example, is caused very much by the fact that there have been conflicts about marches here for a very long time, and by the fact that British authorities have not considered the residents' objections.

Just as the residents group are taking the initiatives to negotiations in the parades issue, nationalists took the initiative to the peace process. The nationalist parties have not tried to exclude anyone from the peace talks but have instead stressed the importance of all actors taking part. But just as the residents groups are intransigent over the contentious marches because they refuse to be treated like second-class citizens, nationalists on the whole are tired of being treated like second-class citizens.

It is up to both the British and the Irish governments to give both communities enough reassurance so a solution can be found to the parades issue and likewise to give reassurance to both communities in order to achieve peace in Northern Ireland. The British government must see its role in the parades issue, and cannot leave it to those involved to solve it, just as it has to see its role in the peace process. Mary Holland reflected upon this in the Irish Times during the eleventh hour negotiations on Holy Thursday, saying that there "has always been a hard political symmetry to this process. The understanding has been that the Irish Government should ensure that the IRA and Sinn Fein signed up to constitutional politics, while the British would deliver the unionists' agreement to new political structures, guaranteeing parity of esteem for Northern nationalists" (Holland, 1998). Holland compares how the two prime ministers have performed in this regard during the talks. Taoiseach Bertie Ahern

has stressed that, in the process of negotiating a settlement, his first responsibility must be to represent the interests of Northern nationalists. By doing this, he has managed to steady the republican movement, educate his own constituency and win the overwhelming support of people in this State for change. This remarkable achievement has not been matched on the British side. ... The British Prime Minister has failed, dramatically, to convince the unionist leader of the need for radical change, still less persuade him to start educating his own constituency about these political realities... the damage that has been done in the past few days is enormous (Holland, 1998).

Mary Holland wrote this when David Trimble had turned down the proposal from Senator Mitchell and it was not certain if he would accept an agreement. In the end, he did, but since Good Friday it has been clear that the unionist community is not ready for radical changes. Trimble is once again balancing between saying yes to the agreement and no to reforms of the RUC, one of the most important issues for nationalists. As Holland points out, the changes of the society that the Good Friday Agreement implies have come as a shock to the unionist community, just as no one has prepared them to the political reality that the parading tradition inevitably has to change. In a peaceful Northern Ireland, no one will have a total right to march wherever they want to.

The nationalist leaders, on the other hand, have made sure that their community has developed with them towards an agreement. In staunchly republican areas like West Belfast, the people put faith in their leaders, despite the fact that the agreement in many ways differs from republican ideals. A West Belfast taxi driver told me two weeks after the agreement was reached: "People are waiting for Sinn Féin. If they endorse it, there will be a yes in the referendum".

All this exemplifies how symbolic reassurance is working. The Irish government has given the reassurance needed for the republican movement to take such dramatic moves as conceding that there will be no united Ireland in the short term. There is a strong support for the Good Friday agreement in the nationalist community. The unionist community, on the other hand, is split. There has not been enough reassurance from London that this agreement will not hand the unionists over to the Republic of Ireland.

During the peace process it has become obvious that the British government (both the conservative and labour) does not understand the need of symbolic reassuring gestures. Mallie and McKittrick gives an example on how London acted after the IRA ceasefire in 1994. Obviously not realizing what a huge step the republican movement had taken, the British government mistrusted the ceasefire and wanted the IRA to declare that it was permanent before talks would start. "The republicans were to receive no public credit for the ceasefire, and were to be kept under constant pressure to prove their bona fides and to make more concessions. To the British this was proper and prudent caution; to the republicans it was minimalist, begrudging and ungenerous" (1997:338). Dublin was very worried about this attitude, and after seventeen months the IRA also broke their ceasefire.

At the beginning of 1998, the loyalist ceasefire was close to a breakdown, as loyalists felt that concessions were only being made to republican prisoners. In fact, it was the Irish government who gave prisoners early release, and they only have republican prisoners. The British government made no gestures at all to the prisoners, and the loyalists felt unjustly treated. After Good Friday, the Irish government immediately released nine prisoners on long sentences, whereas the British government stated that all cases would be individually tried and all releases would be conditional. The release of prisoners is one of the most crucial issues for both republicans and loyalists, and it is obvious that the British government does not realize the need for symbolic reassuring gestures, and that the Irish government does.

The parades issue has also shown the need of reassurance from Britain towards nationalists. The British government has repeatedly bowed for the threat of violence during the last three summers, and it is evident that despite the huge size of the security forces, the state has not been able to protect its citizens. In the weeks before Drumcree III, quite terrifying posters began to appear in the Village area of South Belfast. Few, apart from the Irish News and Tom McGurk in the Sunday Business Post, paid any attention to these posters that in Sweden undoubtedly would be classified as illegal racial agitation with texts such as:

The loyalist people of the Village/Donagall Road have tolerated long enough, the Nationalist Scum that have flooded the area in recent years... In this current Political Climate it is unwise to have a Nationalist as a neighbour and even worse to befriend one. In the light of current events, as from *12 noon on the 1st of July 1997* the Loyalist people of the Village/Donagall Road will no longer be able to guarantee the safety of any Nationalist who chooses to remain within the area, nor can they guarantee the safety of any property where Nationalists are dwelling (quoted in McGurk, 1997c).

McGurk points out how easy it is in Dublin and London to approve of the demand for decommissioning. But considering that posters like this can be set up without hardly any reaction, decommissioning of the IRA is to huge numbers of nationalists a device for disarming the nationalists. August -69 is still in vivid memory of many nationalists, and they still know that when it comes to it they do not get their protection from the state, but from republican guns.

The paramilitary influence in the parades issue is strong, and maybe it is not so surprising that the security forces have bowed to the threat of the Mid-Ulster UVF, later the LVF, for three summers in a row, and forced through the march down Garvaghy Road. Billy Wright – calculated to have murdered about 35 people, senior citizens and pregnant women included – got a hero's funeral in Portadown after he was assassinated in the Maze by the INLA. All businesses in Portadown closed during his funeral, as “with the simple device of a leaflet in the door of every shop, Portadown's business community were the first to realise that Wright's associates are the people who run Portadown, and not the authorities” (McGurk, 1998).

Republican paramilitaries also have very strong grips on certain nationalist areas. The IRA have for example continued with their ‘punishment shootings’ of drug dealers and thieves during their ceasefires. However, the big paramilitary threat is at the moment coming from the groups who are not on ceasefire, and especially the LVF. The shooting spree they have been on since the assassination of Billy Wright shows once again to nationalists their vulnerability in Northern Ireland.

If the British government wishes to see decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, they must give the necessary reassurance to make people feel that they are safe also when their paramilitaries have no arms. Families must feel that they get protection from the security forces when they are intimidated to leave their homes during disorders like Drumcree II. The paramilitary influence on the parades issue must be dealt with. The security forces cannot continue to bow to the threat of force from loyalist and republican paramilitaries concerning contentious parades.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It is now time to round up this paper with a summary of what has been discussed. That the parades issue carries different meanings to unionists and nationalists was quite evident already from the beginning. Both unionists and nationalists feel that civil rights are at stake, but they interpret civil rights in very different ways. To unionists, the freedom of assembly is violated if an Orange march is banned or rerouted. To nationalists, it is a civil right to be spared from abusive marchers outside their homes. The parades issue is an unambiguous metaphor for the conflict in the Northern Irish society. The two communities interpret the world in diametrically opposing ways and to find a middle ground is far from easy. Still, this has to be done. The parades issue might seem to be insoluble, but to reach some kind of solution here would probably mean immensely much also in a wider perspective. It is a central issue, interwoven in the political conflict

and the peace process, and getting Orangemen and national residents to understand each other is a step forward to a peaceful society.

The parades issue has been used in Northern Irish politics, and the most obvious example is David Trimble's winning of party leadership through his hard-lined stand at Drumcree. The parades issue emphasizes the divisions within unionism, and Trimble has in a clever way used it to keep his flock together. He has shown himself to fit very well in Edelman's model of a political Leader, being able to represent both moderate and hard-lined unionism, but which side he really belongs to himself today it's hard to tell. As Andrew Marr wrote in the *Independent* the day after the Good Friday Agreement was reached:

Hopes and fears are embodied in this man, an enormously complicated and combustible mixture of orange, tribal chieftain and modern European social democrat... Trimble has shown exceptional courage too in handling a divided party, boiling with would-be replacements. Some of his behaviour in the last few days made one despair, but in the end he did the right thing, and as the likely leader of a future Northern Ireland assembly he will be tested and challenged constantly in the years ahead (Marr, 1998).

Trimble's real test will be Drumcree this summer. To keep his own supporters, especially the ones who oppose the agreement, he may feel forced to continue his intransigent attitude towards the residents' objections. On the other hand, to be the First Minister of the power-sharing assembly puts other demands on him. His nationalist colleagues in the assembly will not accept that he leads the assembly one day and goes marching down Garvaghy Road the other.

Another person who seems to understand how useful the parades issue can be for an ambitious politician is Taoiseach Bertie Ahern. Supporting the nationalist residents goes down well with many in the Republic of Ireland, especially outside Dublin where republican sentiments are stronger. It is also a way of strengthening his position within his own party, as many in Fianna Fáil feel strongly for the republican cause. Moreover, it strengthens his position within the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, which could be important in the case of the Northern electorate getting a vote in the Dáil.

Bertie Ahern has during his time as a Taoiseach clearly shown that he supports the nationalist side and after the Good Friday Agreement he has become even greener in his talk. It can be expected that the Irish government will continue to stand behind the nationalist residents this summer, and another march forced down Garvaghy Road or Lower Ormeau Road could result in chilly relations between Dublin and London.

One of the most serious problems with the parades issue is that so little has been done to find a solution, and during the last four years the issue has escalated into something extremely dangerous. Much responsibility for this must be put on the British governments, especially John Major's who seemed to think that if they kept away from the burning issue it would solve itself. The labour government got very little time in 1997 to solve Drumcree, but the disturbing fact is that not much has been done for this year. It seems like all measures are taken to keep the parades issue off the agenda until the referendum on May 22. However, even if the people north and south of the border vote yes to the Good Friday Agreement, the parades issue could in July wreck all hopes of a lasting settlement. It is not an issue that can be put off the agenda before it is solved.

What is really disturbing is that it is doubtful whether the authorities involved understand the symbolism of the parades issue. Northern Ireland is so full of explicit symbols that it is easy to put too much emphasis on these and fail to recognize the more implicit symbolism. The only measures taken so far when it comes to the Drumcree march is to strip the march of the overt symbols. But in this analysis of the parades spectacle it should have been made clear that the most loaded symbol is the access to the roads, i.e. if

Orange feet are marching down a contested road or not. As long as it is believed that the march can be made acceptable to the residents with less bands and banners, the Orangemen will continue to celebrate victories and the residents will continue to feel as second-class citizens.

But why did the parades issue become so hot again in 1995? Some explanations have already been offered earlier in the analysis. That the parades have caused serious problems for hundred of years. That there had been confrontations in Portadown and on Garvaghy Road for several years leading up to the first standoff. That 1995 was the first summer of the ceasefires, and the different opinions on marches stressed how polarized Northern Ireland is despite ceasefires and peace processes. That media attention spurred both sides.

But most importantly, the parades issue is about unionism. When looking at how the two communities have constructed Problems, Leaders and Enemies out of the parades spectacle, we saw that it has not been used very much by nationalist leaders. The reason is not only that the nationalist leaders already have strong positions without the help of a parades spectacle, but also that the parades are a unionist concern.

The Loyal Orders' parades symbolizes a culture under threat. The right to march is something to cling on to, when the old world is falling to pieces around you. There is no doubt that unionists are worried about their culture. One of the most common objections among unionist opposed to the Good Friday Agreement is the improved status of the Irish language. One UUP MP opposed to the Good Friday Agreement expressed in full seriousness worries on Irish TV that Telefís na Gaeilge (TnaG, the Irish-speaking TV-station) would be 'beamed into' Northern Irish homes due to the agreement. TnaG can already be received in Northern Ireland to begin with, but worrying about TnaG says more about the weakness of the unionist culture, than the potential of Irish to become the language spoken in Northern Ireland. Only about 5 per cent of the population in Ireland has Irish as the first language, and most Irish people cannot speak the language, albeit that it is a compulsory subject in school.

The most important reason then why the parades issue became so hot in 1995 and onwards is that unionism has reached a crucial point. It is up to unionists to choose now between going on to oppose all change and be Europe's eternal nay-sayers, or accepting the inevitable changes and start recognizing their nationalist neighbours for what they are. Traditional unionism is falling apart in fractions and this is a painful process that the parades issue illustrates. For some, like David Trimble, it seems to be hard to choose which way to go. To march on traditional routes in July is a way to keep contact with the old and known, which gives some safety when you trod upon unknown political roads.

We will probably not see any real solution on the parades issue until unionism has come to terms with itself. This could take longer or shorter time though, considering how much help and reassurance unionists get. It is nevertheless obvious that the solution of the parades issue lies in the hand of the unionist community. They can continue their vigilante tradition, but that will be hard as there is so much happening to Northern Ireland that is not in the hands of British, Irish and Northern Irish politicians. Or they could try and adjust themselves to the new political reality, and start respecting their nationalist neighbours' nationality, culture and tradition, in the same way as they want their nationality, culture and tradition to be respected. Hopefully, in a future Northern Ireland, Orange marches will be just as natural and uncontroversial as the traditional music festivals that are flourishing through Ireland the whole summer.

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APPENDIX I

TERMINOLOGY

I follow McGarry and O’Leary (1995:508-509) and Guelke (1997:74) in their way of using terminology considering Northern Ireland. The people in Northern Ireland are often divided into Protestants and Catholics. However, for two reasons this is often not a good way of distinguishing the two communities. One is that it could imply that religion is a main cause of the conflict, whereas the most important cause is the nationality issue, i.e. which nationstate to belong to, something which is developed further in the paper. The other reason is that religion is not always equivalent to the political affiliations. Therefore, the political terms for the two traditions are most often used for this study. Thus in this paper:

- ◆ **Catholic** – is not a synonym to an Irish nationalist, but a short-hand expression for a believer in the doctrines of the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church. **Cultural Catholics** refer to both practising Catholics and people born into the Roman Catholic religion who no longer believe or practise its tenets.
- ◆ **Protestant** – is not a synonym of a unionist, but a short-hand expression of a believer of one of the many Protestant churches in Northern Ireland. **Cultural Protestants** are those who have Protestant religious backgrounds.
- ◆ **nationalist** – refers to an Irish nationalist, usually a cultural Catholic.
- ◆ **unionist** – refers to anyone who believes in preserving the union of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
- ◆ **republican** – refers to a nationalist who is ready to support the use of violence to achieve a united Ireland.
- ◆ **loyalist** – refers to militant supporters of the separation of Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland, including those ready to use violence in the defence of the union, and members of the Loyal Orders. **The Loyal Orders** refers to the various orders – of which the largest are the Orange Order, the Apprentice Boys of Derry, and the Royal Black Perceptory – that attach special importance to Northern Ireland’s Protestant heritage and to the celebration through parades of past victories of Protestants over Catholics.
- ◆ **paramilitaries** – are members of illegal or semi-legal armies such as the IRA, the UDA and the UVF. I am avoiding the more emotive expression ‘terrorists’.

Names of territories and cities can also have political values. A tricky one is the name of the territory in question. Unionists (and British media) still call it ‘Ulster’, even though it is not Ulster. Ulster is one of the four historical provinces of Ireland, and it consists of nine counties. Northern Ireland is six of these nine counties, and to nationalists and people south of the border Ulster is still the nine original counties. Nationalists often call Northern Ireland ‘the Six Counties’ to point out that this territory is neither Ulster nor the northern part of Ireland. The most northern part of Ireland, Co. Donegal, is situated in the Republic of Ireland. ‘The Six Counties’ is the term that best describes this north east part of Ireland, but as it is loaded with political value I will only use the official name ‘Northern Ireland’. Thus:

- ◆ **Northern Ireland** – refers to the formal political unit created by the Government of Ireland Act, consisting of the counties Derry, Antrim, Down, Armagh, Tyrone and Fermanagh.

- ◆ **Ulster** – refers to the historical province of Ulster including the six counties of Northern Ireland and Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan.
- ◆ **Derry** – the second city of Northern Ireland and also the name of one of the counties. The British and unionists not living in the city call it ‘Londonderry’. The ‘London’ prefix goes back to the early 17th century when the city was under the control of the corporation of London. In the Republic of Ireland, Derry is the only name used. Both names have been used in official designations, but to avoid awkward slashes (‘Derry/Londonderry’), ‘Derry’ is used in this paper as that is what the city’s inhabitants use. Derry is also closest to the city’s original Irish name ‘Doire’.
- ◆ **Ireland** – refers to the geographical entity.
- ◆ **The Republic of Ireland** – refers to the formal political unit established in 1949 of what in 1922 had become the Irish Free State. The state acquired full sovereignty in 1937 and was declared a Republic in 1949.
- ◆ **Britain** – or Great Britain, refers to the part of the United Kingdom that excludes Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland is part of the UK but not of Britain.

In the Republic of Ireland, some political terms from Irish are used also in the English language and an explanation is needed for readers with little knowledge of the Irish political system:

- ◆ **Dáil Éireann** – is the lower house of the Irish Parliament, the **Oireachtas**. The upper house is called the **Seanad**. When talking about the parliament, the Irish usually refer to **the Dáil**.
- ◆ **TD** – A member of parliament is in Irish called ‘Teachta Dála’ abbreviated as TD. The Irish always refer to their members of parliament as TD’s, unless they are speaking with foreigners. This is also the term used in this paper for Irish members of parliament.
- ◆ **An Taoiseach** – is Irish for prime minister, and just as members of parliament are always called TD’s, the Irish prime minister is always referred to as the Taoiseach.

APPENDIX II

ACTORS

POLITICAL ACTORS

- ◆ **UUP** – Ulster Unionist Party. The biggest party in Northern Ireland, and the biggest unionist party. During the Drumcree disorder in 1995 its leader was still James Molyneaux, but shortly after David Trimble took over.
- ◆ **DUP** – Democratic Unionist Party. The next biggest unionist party. Its leader is Rev. Ian Paisley who has not only founded the DUP but also the Free Presbyterian Church. Usually more extreme than the UUP.
- ◆ **UK Unionist Party** – a small unionist party led by Robert McCartney.
- ◆ **PUP** – Progressive Unionist Party. The political wing of the UVF, and one of the two small unionist parties that emerged with the loyalist ceasefire in October 1994. Its leader is Billy Hutchinson.
- ◆ **UDP** – Ulster Democratic Party. The political wing of the UDA, and the other of the two small unionist parties that emerged in October 1994. Its leader is Gary McMichael. The PUP and the UDP have shown a much greater readiness to negotiate and compromise about Northern Ireland's future than the other unionist parties and was for example not behind the demand of the IRA decommissioning their arms before Sinn Féin could take part in the peace talks.
- ◆ **Alliance Party** – a cross-community party, that wants to maintain the union. Its leader is Lord Alderdice.
- ◆ **SDLP** – Social Democratic Labour Party. The biggest nationalist party, and the second largest party in Northern Ireland. The SDLP has its origin in the civil rights movement and its leader is John Hume, a former civil rights activist. The party works for a united Ireland with constitutional means.
- ◆ **Sinn Féin** – the next biggest party among nationalists and together with the IRA what is usually called **the republican movement**. Sinn Féin was founded in 1905 and was one of the main movements behind the Easter Rising in 1916 and the War of Independence in 1919-1921, but has since then split several times. The latest split was in 1985 when Sinn Féin split in Sinn Féin and Republican Sinn Féin. Sinn Féin's president is Gerry Adams, and the party works for a united socialist Ireland.
- ◆ **Republican Sinn Féin** – a small hard-lined republican party, founded in 1985 when Sinn Féin split over the question of abstentionism. Sinn Féin has traditionally refused to take their seats in elected assemblies, but decided in 1985 to take their seats in the Dáil. The ones who wanted to continue total abstentionism formed their own group, Republican Sinn Féin, under Ruairí Ó Brádaigh.
- ◆ **Women's Coalition** – a very small cross-community party, with feminist ideals. It got much praise for its role during the peace talks. Its leader is Monica McWilliams.
- ◆ **Fianna Fáil** – the largest party in the Republic of Ireland. Originates from the republican side in the Civil War 1922-23 that later turned to constitutional means (the other republicans continued as Sinn Féin). Leader of coalition governments during large parts of the peace process. Party leader during the beginning of the peace process was Albert Reynolds, later on Bertie Ahern took over.
- ◆ **Fine Gael** – the second largest party in the Republic of Ireland. Originates from the Free State side in the Civil War and are usually seen as less nationalist than Fianna Fáil. Fine Gael led the so called rainbow coalition (Fine Gael, Labour and the

Democratic Left) during some years of the peace process and its leader is John Bruton.

- ◆ **Conservatives** – the Conservative and Unionist Party. A British party led by John Major, with Sir Patrick Mayhew as Northern Secretary during the last few years before the Conservatives lost power. Unionists are traditionally supporting the Conservatives in Westminster.
- ◆ **Labour** – the British Labour party. Took over government after the British general election in 1997. Party leader is Tony Blair and Mo Mowlam is the Northern Secretary.
- ◆ **NIO** – the Northern Ireland Office. The ‘government’ of Northern Ireland, since direct rule was imposed in 1972.

SECURITY FORCES

- ◆ **British army** - troops were temporarily sent over in August 1969, to bring order in the state of anarchy prevailing then, but they have remained since.
- ◆ **RUC** - Royal Ulster Constabulary. The police force in Northern Ireland. Nearly all the members are Protestants, and the force is very unpopular among nationalists. However, in times of crises like the Drumcree stand-offs, loyalists also tend to turn against the RUC. Sir Hugh Annesley was Chief Constable during the two first Drumcree disorders, and during the third Ronnie Flanagan had taken over his role.

PARAMILITARIES

- ◆ **UDA** – Ulster Defence Association. A loyalist paramilitary organization and the military wing of the UDP. The UDA was until a few years ago legal, and then carried out its killings under various other names of which the most known is the UFF (Ulster Freedom Fighters). To simplify, I am only talking about the UDA as the UFF more or less is the same organization.
- ◆ **UVF** – Ulster Volunteer Force. A loyalist paramilitary organization, formed in the 18th century and the military wing of the PUP.
- ◆ **LVF** – Loyalist Volunteer Force. A loyalist paramilitary organization, a splinter group based in the Portadown region and made up of former members of the UDA and the UVF. LVF stand outside the loyalist cease-fire. Its leader was Billy Wright who used to lead the UVF’s Mid-Ulster Brigade. In the end of December 1997 he was killed by the INLA within the Maze prison.
- ◆ **CLMC** – Combined Loyalist Military Command. An umbrella organization for the UDA and the UVF, during the first years of the ceasefires. The CLMC has now ceased to exist.
- ◆ **IRA** – Irish Republican Army. A republican paramilitary group and the military wing of Sinn Féin. The IRA was founded in 1918 and forced Britain to the negotiation table during the War of Independence in 1919-21. The IRA continued its fight for an Irish Republic on the republican side in the Civil War 1922-23. After the so called border campaign in 1956-62 the IRA nearly ceased to exist. The attacks on nationalist homes in August 1969 mobilized the IRA again.
- ◆ **INLA** – Irish National Liberation Army. A small republican paramilitary group whose killing campaign peaked in the 1980s, when internal feuds took over and resulted in most of the leaders assassinated. The INLA stands outside the ceasefires and have got some new life the last few years.
- ◆ **CIRA** – called itself the Continuity Army Council (CAC) in the beginning but are most often called the Continuity IRA or Continuity Army nowadays. A small re-

publican paramilitary group, formed in 1996 mainly by former IRA members. The CIRA shares the ideals of Republican Sinn Féin but is not this party's military wing. Just as the INLA, the CIRA stands outside the ceasefires.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

- ◆ **Orange Order** – the largest of the **Loyal Orders**. Other Loyal Orders are the Apprentice Boys of Derry and the Royal Black Perceptory. More is told about the Loyal Orders in the paper.
- ◆ **Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition** – the organization speaking for the nationalist residents at Garvaghy Road in Portadown. The leader of Garvaghy Road Residents' Coalition is the local independent councillor Breandán Mac Cionnaith, a former republican prisoner. Other residents groups are the **Bogside Residents' Group**, based in Derry, and the **Lower Ormeau Road Concerned Citizens, LOCC**, based in south Belfast.